

JPRS-USA-86-009

10 OCTOBER 1986

USSR Report

USA: ECONOMICS, POLITICS, IDEOLOGY

No 6, JUNE 1986

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[Translation of the Russian-language monthly journal SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA published in Moscow by the Institute of U.S. and Canadian Studies, USSR Academy of Sciences.]

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PUBLICATION DATA

English title : USA: ECONOMICS, POLITICS, IDEOLOGY
No 6, June 1986

Russian title : SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA

Author (s) :

Editor (s) : V. M. Berezhev

Publishing House : Izdatelstvo Nauka

Place of publication : Moscow

Date of publication : June 1986

Signed to press : 23 May 1986

Copies : 30,000

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politika, ideologiya", 1986

ZAGLADIN VIEWS PRESENT, FUTURE OF U.S. ANTI-WAR MOVEMENT

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 6, Jun 86 (signed to press 23 May 86) pp 3-12

[Article by N. V. Zagladin: "The Antiwar Movement Today"; passages rendered in all capital letters printed in boldface in source]

[Text] The political report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 27th party congress says: "The development of the worldwide revolutionary process and the growth of mass democratic and antiwar movements have considerably expanded and strengthened **THE TREMENDOUS POTENTIAL FOR PEACE, REASON AND GOODWILL.** This is a powerful counterbalance to imperialism's aggressive policy."¹ Antiwar movements are now growing stronger overseas as well.

Until the 1960's the struggle for peace in the United States was limited in terms of public involvement and its scales were much smaller than, for example, in the West European states. There were many reasons for this, but the main one was that the issue of war and peace did not affect all Americans directly and was usually viewed as a matter of ethics, an issue of a religious rather than a political nature. It is not surprising that most of the antiwar demonstrations of the 1950's were connected with the activities of religious pacifist organizations (as always, the Quakers played a perceptible role).

In the 1960's there were changes in U.S. public opinion with regard to the issue of war and peace. They stemmed primarily from the change in the strategic situation, from the fact that the American continent had lost its previous invulnerability when the USSR acquired nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery. Besides this, the U.S. defeat in the war in Vietnam strengthened antimilitarist feelings.

The protest movement against this war did not become an important political factor immediately. It began with individual acts of protest and demonstrations by political groups with limited influence. In time, however, antiwar feelings and the realization of the amorality and futility of the war in Vietnam became common. There is no question that the past experience in demonstrations against the U.S. aggression in Southeast Asia was quite instructive and had a positive effect on the development of antimilitarist protests in the early 1980's.

Their scales are attested to by the following figures: When the largest antiwar demonstration in U.S. history was held in New York on 12 June 1982, its participants, according to different estimates, numbered from 700,000 to 1 million. A similar demonstration was held in Washington on 27 August 1983: It was attended by around 400,000 demonstrators from all parts of the country.

Current difficulties in the development of the antiwar struggle are connected with an entire group of objective and subjective factors. These difficulties, as we will demonstrate below, are not insurmountable, but they have a substantial effect on the forms and conditions of antiwar activity.

Above all, the mass media in the United States (the national press, radio and television) are under the strict and comprehensive control of monopolies. Independent news sources are circulated either in small numbers or only on the local level. Ruling circles have considerable ability to bury information about the activities of undesirable forces and misrepresent their views. This was the tactic the administration chose when the first symptoms of the growth of the antiwar struggle were noticed at the beginning of the 1980's. The Republican administration learned lessons from the campaign against the war in Vietnam: The government's attempts to stifle the growing protest movement with force, repression and the criminal prosecution of activists (these repressive actions were covered by the press, radio and television) at that time did not intimidate the masses, but had the opposite effect by arousing public interest in the aims and goals of the struggle.

In the 1980's the muffling of mass protests against militarization was accompanied by another process. Washington resorted to a series of ideological propagandistic maneuvers to neutralize the movement. The statements of Republican Party leaders and of R. Reagan himself were filled with much more flexible rhetoric. As the 1984 campaign drew near, there were more frequent statements about the administration's desire for peace and about its willingness to limit the arms race. At the same time, ruling circles stepped up military preparations, developed new weapons systems and decided to militarize outer space. The program for the militarization of space, labeled the "Strategic Defense Initiative," was presented to Americans as a universal means of eliminating the danger of nuclear war forever. The Soviet Union's warnings that the SDI would destabilize the international situation even more were ignored. The warnings of American scientists about the impossibility of creating SDI systems of absolutely guaranteed defense were also ignored.

The administration's ideological maneuvers had a limited but definite impact. According to public opinion polls, for example, the public mood was unfavorable for the Republicans in September 1983. Only 26 percent of all those polled believed that this party could secure peace, while 39 percent gave the Democrats a vote of confidence in this area. Later, however, the balance of feelings changed in favor of the administration: By September 1984, 39 percent of the voters already believed that it was acting in the interest of peace, while 38 percent still gave preference to the Democrats in this regard. According to the results of a poll conducted in October 1984, 57 percent of the voters believed that the Reagan Administration would guarantee the military security of the United States; it is true that only 44 percent believed

that it could keep the peace, and only 33 percent had faith in its ability to resolve the nuclear arms control problem.²

After General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee M. S. Gorbachev's meeting in Geneva with U.S. President R. Reagan, the feelings of Americans changed somewhat: 74 percent of all respondents supported the conclusion of an agreement resulting in the cessation of SDI-related projects. At the same time, 59 percent believed that the "Star Wars" plans were of a defensive nature and would strengthen U.S. security.³

These data prove that many Americans still do not associate the guarantee of national security with the conclusion of arms control agreements and believe that security can only be achieved through the accumulation of military arsenals. This is also a result of the mistrust of the USSR, which has been cultivated for decades and has had an adverse effect even on the antiwar movement by giving rise to serious ideological difficulties. These difficulties are connected with the internal heterogeneity of the social-class and political composition of the movement.

In 1980 and 1981 warnings about the dangers of militarization were voiced primarily by academic groups, religious pacifist organizations, environmental protection movements and other--not only leftist--forces. The movement was able to find a slogan capable of uniting extremely diverse forces and striking a chord in the American mind. This was the slogan of the nuclear freeze. It also presupposed the curtailment of military programs, the cessation of tests of nuclear and other weapons and the commencement of serious USSR-U.S. talks on ways of curbing the arms race. It is indicative that the majority of Americans, in spite of their biased view of Soviet foreign policy, had no doubt that the Soviet Union would have a positive reaction to a U.S. nuclear "freeze."

The failure of the "freeze" bills in Congress in 1982 and early 1983 caused many leaders of the antiwar movement to give serious thought to the prospects for its further development and future forms of struggle. There were fairly strong feelings in favor of the continued concentration of efforts exclusively in one area--the "freeze"--and the subsequent gradual reduction of nuclear arsenals to the point of their complete elimination. For example, L. Harris, a leading public opinion analyst, asserted that the attempt to associate the issue of nuclear war with other problems would undermine the exceptional strength of the antinuclear movement and create false ideas about it.⁴

The attempts of some leaders of the antiwar movement to restrict its sphere of activity reflected more than worries about the possible weakening of movement unity. Something else also played a part: The segment of the "elite" of the bourgeois society that professes liberal views was afraid of the growth of public activity. Liberal circles, affiliated politically with the moderate wing of the Democratic Party, wanted to confine the movement to the two-party political machine and to make it something like an appendage of the Democratic Party or its mass base, a base which could be relied upon to guarantee the success of the Democratic presidential candidate in 1988.

There was also a clearly defined general democratic branch of the antiwar movement from the very beginning. The "freeze" slogan was also supported by various organizations of ethnic minorities, youth, women and other organizations generally defined as the "new social movements." An important role was also played by the much smaller but more politically active parties and organizations taking a social-reformist stance (Democratic Socialists, Socialist Action and the Socialist Workers Party). Members of the Communist Party, USA, are participating most effectively in the antiwar struggle.

It was stressed at the 23d National Congress of the CP USA in November 1983 that the American people's main objective was to stop "U.S. imperialism's senseless advance" toward nuclear confrontation. Aspects of the struggle for peace were discussed by a special congress commission, and it was noted at meetings of the commission that the unification of the peaceful majority would necessitate the repulsion of anticommunism and anti-Sovietism. The importance of opposing the policy of intervention and covert operations, leading to the destabilization of the international situation and the creation of new seats of tension in the world, was underscored.⁵

The existence of two main currents in the antiwar movement, one of which reflects the views of the realistic wing of the bourgeoisie, the wing opposing the militarist policy line of the Republican administration, while the other reflects the attitudes of democratic social strata, creates difficulties in the antiwar struggle but also promises certain advantages and new opportunities. It would not be right to draw a precise line between these currents. In addition to the fact that many antiwar organizations take intermediate positions on ideological matters, there is also the consideration that each wing of the antiwar movement has an incentive to work with the other. The liberal bourgeoisie, we repeat, regards the antiwar movement as a potential electoral base and strives to avoid situations leading to its internal polarization. By the same token, at this time the leftist democratic forces in the antiwar movement cannot expect their demands to influence the policy of ruling circles without the support of the liberal wing of the bourgeoisie and without broader influence in the establishment and the mass media.

Soviet researcher A. B. Pankin believes that the antiwar movement can now deal with the mass media "from a position of strength," because it has created its own "communicative infrastructure," publishes its own books, magazines and bulletins and is "penetrating the depths of society, largely bypassing its traditional informational structure."⁶ It is true that the new social movements in the United States use fairly diverse channels of communication with broad segments of the public, but it is also obvious that these channels are no substitute for the mass media, especially television. After all, the role of the latter is genuinely colossal. For example, after the film "The Day After," vividly illustrating (although in a mild form) the horrors of nuclear war, was shown on television in fall 1983, the number of people supporting nuclear arms control increased by 12 percent.⁷ Leaflets, brochures and discussions do not have this kind of impact.

On the one hand, the liberal bourgeois influence on the antiwar movement is connected with the tendency of many of its activists to associate the "freeze"

prospect with the victory of Democrats in the congressional elections of 1986 and the presidential elections of 1986. In this connection, it is indicative that antimilitarist feelings are stronger among registered Democrats than among members of the Republican Party. At the end of 1985, for example, 75 percent of the Republican voters were in favor of the SDI (19 percent were opposed), but the figure for Democrats was only 46 percent (with 47 percent opposed).⁸ But the same things that increase the Democrats' chance of victory cause the antiwar forces to employ passive and temporizing tactics.

On the other hand, liberals from ruling strata are frequently inclined to accept an ideology in which the realization of the danger of the arms race is combined with traditional anticommunism and anti-Sovietism; their opposition to Washington's militarist policy is confined to disagreement with its methods, but not with its goals.

Many Democratic Party leaders who now favor agreements with the USSR to curb the arms race did much to undermine detente during the Carter Administration, and they certainly are not giving up their negative feelings about the Soviet Union in a number of areas. Even today, some segments of the U.S. antiwar movement are not free of traces of anticommunism.

As a result, participation in the antiwar movement by the CP USA on an equal basis with other organizations in the movement is regarded with some suspicion by antiwar activists. There is also the fear that this will add fuel to the arguments of the ideologists of military-industrial circles who have declared that the peace movement was "inspired" by the Soviet Union.

It must be said that distorted ideas about real socialism, ideas cultivated by the bourgeois mass media, are also quite widespread in the peace movement. Finally, many members of the movement agree with the implied "equal responsibility" of the USSR and United States for the escalation of international tension in the early 1980's.

It is true that some evolution has been witnessed here. At first this implication had no effect on the struggle for the "freeze" because its advocates had no doubt that the USSR would react favorably to any positive changes in the U.S. position. Besides this, at a time when official propaganda blamed the USSR for undermining the policy of detente, for many Americans the acceptance of the idea of "equal responsibility" was equivalent to the acknowledgment that U.S. ruling circles had also been wrong and were also to blame. Under the influence of the USSR's peace initiatives, more people realized how unconstructive White House policy was and there was a tendency to replace the thesis of "equal responsibility" with the idea of the greater responsibility of the United States for the escalation of tension in the world. This tendency is developing under the influence of the growing strength of the general democratic current in the antiwar movement. Nevertheless, the idea of "equal responsibility" is still being employed by rightwing forces to split the antiwar movement.

In spite of the pressure of the liberal bourgeoisie, in 1983 the struggle for peace began to transcend its original framework of exclusively antiwar protest

and began to be combined objectively with the struggle for a broader democratic alternative to the present policy line of U.S. ruling circles.⁹

There has also been a natural process of consolidation in the peace movement. The Fifth National Conference of the Nuclear Weapons Freeze Campaign, one of the largest and most influential U.S. peace organizations, was a symptom of change in the antiwar movement. At this conference, which was held in December 1984, decisions were made on the organizational structure and a permanent national committee was created (its members include one representative for each state and up to 13 representatives of cooperating organizations). The national committee is authorized to make decisions on the expediency and methods of carrying out the projected national membership campaign, which attests in itself to the prospect of an independent political structure for the antiwar movement. The conference placed special emphasis on the objectives of the struggle for the "freeze" and for the reduction of the danger of the accidental start of nuclear war; the need to prevent the creation of space weapons systems and first-strike weapons was discussed at length. A fundamentally new element was the decision on the need for a "long-range strategy," consisting of a group of extensive proposals representing an alternative platform to Reagan Administration policy. The conference decisions noted the need to stop the use of "intervention as an instrument of foreign policy" and to achieve "economic and social justice in the United States," not only the "freeze" and simultaneous reduction of arms, but also the improvement of living conditions for the poor and non-white segments of the population.¹⁰

The conference stipulated the main slogans of the movement: "No intervention. Stop U.S. intervention in Central America, the Caribbean, the Middle East, Asia, the Pacific basin and Europe. Build a just society. Create jobs and reduce the military budget. Satisfy the needs of the public, eliminate racism and all forms of discrimination and stop the arms race, beginning with the cessation of the testing, production and deployment of nuclear weapons."¹¹

These slogans primarily testify to the increasing public awareness of the simple fact that the arms race is not the result of the allegedly "objective" improvement of weapons and certainly not the result of a Soviet "threat" to U.S. security. Its primary causes lie, on the one hand, in Washington's imperious policy, presupposing the failure to consider the wishes of other peoples and requiring the backing of military strength, and, on the other, in the selfish interests of the monopolies of the military-industrial complex, which are growing rich on military contracts. Obviously, the struggle for peace will be more effective if it is waged not only against the arms race but also against its causes--that is, if it is waged for the democratization of society and against the military monopolies and the political forces expressing their interests.

Of course, the stipulation of slogans is not equivalent to the adoption of a precise and detailed program of action in the full sense of the term. The heterogeneity of the antiwar movement and the lack of a strict organizational structure now exclude the possibility of this kind of program. Nevertheless, there are the widely supported slogans. Detailed interpretations of them can be found in the publications of antiwar organizations and in articles by scientists enjoying prestige in the movement. According to movement activists,

these publications perform an "educative" function and are intended to focus public attention on the dangers of the current world situation, explain the sources of these dangers and point the way to the positive alternative for which a struggle must be waged.

In 1985 these publications, just as in the past, concentrated on the danger of the new military programs and appealed for a struggle against the creation of new weapons systems (the MX, cruise missiles and space weapons). Furthermore, the discussion of the "Star Wars" program acquired national dimensions. In March 1985 THE NEW YORK TIMES printed a series of articles written by prominent correspondents and experts (particularly P. Warnke) on various aspects of the program; they asked the direct question: "Is there a better way of guaranteeing U.S. security?"¹²

Demonstrations against the growth of the military budget are a new element of the struggle for peace in our day. The campaign for the freeze resolved to aid in working out the legal bases and a "legal strategy" to oppose the collection of taxes for military purposes.¹³ The American Friends Service Committee, the Quaker lobbying organization, appealed to the voters to pressure members of Congress for cuts in the military budget in 1986. According to a committee publication, 55.1 percent of the taxes paid by the average American were already being used for military purposes in 1984, and in 1986 the administration again proposed an increase in the military budget. This has been accompanied by sharp cuts in funds for social needs. For example, all expenditures to assist children from needy families are exceeded by the cost of a single Trident submarine. More funds are allocated for the production of toxic substances than for programs to assist the aged. The funds allocated by the United States to assist the hungry in Africa were equivalent to less than one-fifteenth of the cost of "Star Wars" research projects,¹⁴ and so forth.

The antiwar movement is not only demanding cuts in military spending but is also proposing measures to restrain the appetite of the military-industrial complex. Nuclear freeze advocates adopted a program of legislative initiatives including a point on "economic conversion," the conversion of military production for the satisfaction of civilian needs.¹⁵ A point on conversion is also included in the program of action of the American Friends Service Committee.¹⁶

The details of this conversion have not been decided yet. An idea expressed by D. Shearer, a former instructor of political economy at Maryland State University, is popular in the antiwar movement. In his opinion, firms and enterprises manufacturing military products and receiving more than 75 percent of their income from government contracts could be nationalized. Shearer believes that the antiwar movement's approach to conversion is "similar to the position of leftist parties in France, Chile and Italy." The conversion program, Shearer feels, could become the organizational basis for a "democratic leftist movement" or for the left wing of the Democratic Party.¹⁷

Ideas about the reordering of foreign policy priorities, ideas elaborated in the publications of the antiwar movement, are more detailed than the proposals on necessary internal changes in society. According to these ideas, the

United States should renounce the use of force against the people of small countries and play a more constructive role in world affairs. The authority of the United States and its interests in the international arena, according to the authors of the "alternative" proposals, will be secured more reliably if the United States participates more extensively in programs aiding the hungry and assists in the peaceful resolution of conflicts.

The struggle to stop the interventionist actions in Central America has acquired the most serious dimensions in the United States. Around 500,000 inhabitants of El Salvador and Guatemala have had to leave their countries in recent years to escape the repressive actions of military regimes supported by Washington. Peaceful forces in the United States have proposed a program of aid to these refugees. More than 180 churches in the United States, belonging to different religious communities, were declared "refugee sanctuaries"; contributions from parishioners were used to supply them with food and so forth. Ruling circles immediately responded with repressive measures: The program of aid was declared illegal and around 30,000 Salvadorans were deported. On 14 January 1985, 16 activists who had helped the refugees were arrested in Rochester, Philadelphia, Seattle and Tucson, and on 23 April they were charged with "conspiracy" and with organizing the illegal entry of the United States by refugees. Protest rallies were held in many cities on the day of the trial, and another 15 religious communities declared themselves "refugee sanctuaries" when the verdict was announced.¹⁸

The forms of struggle employed by the antiwar movement are becoming increasingly diverse. They include the pressuring of congressmen, the support of candidates in favor of the "freeze," the sending of delegations from electoral districts to Washington, letters to the editors of newspapers, legislators and the President, the drafting of bills (they are introduced for discussion by members of the House of Representatives and the Senate who support the aims of the antiwar movement), the distribution of leaflets, brochures and other printed materials, their subsequent discussion at meetings of antiwar activists with citizens, the organization of seminars and symposiums with prominent speakers on current issues related to war and peace, referendums in electoral districts, mass rallies, demonstrations and peace camps, the declaration of certain regions and cities nuclear-free zones, the picketing of testing grounds (especially the nuclear testing ground in Nevada), military enterprises and establishments of the military-industrial complex, and other measures within the bounds of "non-violent civil disobedience," frequently defined as "direct action."

Problems in the development of Soviet-American relations occupy a prominent place in the activities of antiwar forces. The publications of the antiwar movement consistently underscore the importance of the improvement of these relations for the future of the world and refute the lies of the apologists for the arms race who accuse the USSR of violating negotiated treaties and agreements and who assert that there can be no dialogue with the Soviet Union other than "from a position of strength."

In 1985 the American Friends Service Committee proposed the passage of several resolutions by the Congress. They were supposed to record the desirability,

expediency and mutual benefit of broader scientific and technical cooperation between the USSR and the United States and broader contacts between the people of the two countries. The publications of several prominent American scientists and humanitarians, stipulating specific ways of improving Soviet-American relations, aroused great interest. For example, Boston University Professor W. Clemens wrote an article for the CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR in which he advised a "new detente" between the USSR and the United States. In his opinion, "the West and East must create a mechanism capable of limiting confrontation and reflecting their common interest in peace, economic development and environmental protection."¹⁹

Similar ideas have been developed in publications of the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research in Washington. As a special institute bulletin on Soviet-American relations noted, regardless of whatever successes might be achieved in bilateral talks on the improvement of these relations, the White House could take several unilateral steps to normalize the international situation. According to institute researcher D. Caldwell, it would be expedient for the United States to give up its belligerent anti-Soviet rhetoric and not count on military superiority to the USSR, not strive to hurt Soviet interests at any cost, stop viewing all crises in the world as the result of rivalry between the West and the East, consider them in their "regional context," adopt a more balanced policy in the Middle East and give more consideration to Arab interests. The bulletin also proposes that a more constructive policy be conducted toward the states of Eastern Europe, especially Poland, that the efforts of the Contadora group to surmount the crisis in Central America be supported, and that the central problems of Soviet-American relations (particularly the need to curb the arms race) not be "linked" with secondary issues.²⁰

Statements of this kind frequently contain criticism of various aspects of Soviet foreign and domestic policy, and this is not surprising. However, the realism and constructive nature of their approach, which are valued by the antiwar movement, consist in the acknowledgement of the fact that unavoidable differences between social systems and differences of opinion must not lead to military confrontations or be settled by military means in today's world.

Antiwar organizations in the United States attach great importance to the development of contacts between the Soviet and American populations, proceeding from the belief that a fuller understanding of the life of the Soviet people by Americans will dispel stereotypes cultivated by militarist propaganda. In their daily activities, U.S. antiwar forces devote considerable attention to the organization of contacts of this kind and to more thorough familiarization with the life of the Soviet people during trips to the nation of Soviets. In 1982, for example, E. Chivian and R. Shaw, members of Physicians of the World for the Prevention of Nuclear War, shot a video film in the Soviet Union, "What Soviet Children Say About Nuclear War," which has been shown several times in the United States. After it was shown in the state of Massachusetts, antiwar and religious organizations shot their own film, "Students Talk About Nuclear War," based on conversations with 40 high school juniors and seniors in Watertown and Belmont. These two movies, with their great emotional impact, have become famous and were even shown in the Capitol.²²

The influence of Soviet peace initiatives, their effect on the antiwar movement in the United States, is a more complex matter. Many of these initiatives have been disregarded or presented to Americans in distorted form. Militarist groups are striving to weaken their impact by portraying them as purely propagandistic actions. As General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee M. S. Gorbachev said when he was interviewed by TIME magazine, "unfortunately, every time we try to break out of the vicious circle of the arms race and mutual suspicion, we hear only the negative reply: 'No! No! No! Propaganda! Propaganda! Propaganda!'"²³

Nevertheless, militarist forces have not always been able to conceal the Soviet Union's far-reaching proposals from the American public. For example, the USSR's unilateral pledge not to use nuclear weapons first evoked a warm response in the antiwar movement. The reaction to the Soviet Government's unilateral suspension of all nuclear tests was also extremely positive. Incidentally, on 6 August 1985, on the 40th anniversary of the first use of the American atomic weapon in combat against Hiroshima, the U.S. antiwar movement organized a series of important undertakings, representing part of the worldwide campaign of antiwar forces for the cessation of all nuclear tests. The Soviet peace initiatives announced on 15 January 1986 had great repercussions. American peace organizations with close ties to antiwar forces in other countries have been particularly active. In particular, these include the Quakers and other religious organizations, Greenpeace, which is quite influential in the United States, Physicians for Social Responsibility (the American branch of the Physicians of the World for the Prevention of Nuclear War), the National Committee of Radiation Victims, connected with the International League of Veterans of Atomic Warfare, and other organizations.

After the meeting in Geneva and under the influence of the entire group of Soviet peace initiatives, the U.S. public put stronger pressure on the White House to demonstrate its love of peace in actions as well as words. There has also been greater opposition to the militarist policy line in the "upper echelon" of American society. This is attested to by the heated debates in Congress on the expediency of allocating funds for the support of the "Contras" in Nicaragua and the new increase in military spending.

Rightwing forces with an interest in the continued militarization of society and in a tougher foreign policy line, however, have not laid down their arms. On the contrary, the budding prospect of better Soviet-American relations and a healthier international atmosphere in general has intensified their resistance of any steps to relax tension in the world.

The antiwar movement is mobilizing all forces for the repulsion of the opponents of the "spirit of Geneva." Changes are taking place in American society and in the American mind, and these changes could have a positive effect on the political development of the United States in the broadest sense of the term.

FOOTNOTES

1. "Materialy XXVII syezda Kommunisticheskoy partii Sovetskogo Soyuza" [Materials of the 27th CPSU Congress], Moscow, 1986, p 70.

2. PUBLIC OPINION, December/January 1985, pp 37-38.
3. TIME, 25 November 1985, p 29.
4. "The United States: The Conservative Wave," translated from English, prefaced and edited by A. Yu. Melvil, Moscow, 1984, p 162.
5. PROBLEMY MIRA I SOTSIALIZMA, 1984, No 2, pp 21-22.
6. SSHA: EPI, 1984, No 4, p 25.
7. Ibid., 1985, No 3, p 14.
8. TIME, 25 November 1985, p 29.
9. SSHA: EPI, 1983, No 10, pp 55-62.
10. "Decisions Made by the Fifth National Conference of the Nuclear Weapons Freeze Campaign," St. Louis, 7-9 December 1984, p 3.
11. THE MOBILIZER, Spring 1985, vol 4, No 3, p 3.
12. THE NEW YORK TIMES, 8 March 1985.
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17. D. Shearer, "Swords into Ploughshares. A Program for Conversion," s.a., p 10.
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21. In March 1985 the author of this article took part in one of these undertakings--a Soviet-American seminar in the academic center of the American Friends Service Committee in Pendle Hill (Pennsylvania)--and had an opportunity to learn about the activities of antiwar organizations in Washington and Boston and attend the annual session of Quaker organizations on Soviet-American relations in Philadelphia. In January and February 1986 the author visited a number of scientific and academic centers and social organizations in the United States.

22. WATERTOWN PRESS, 9 August 1984.

23. M. S. Gorbachev, "Izbrannyye rechi i statii" [Selected Speeches and Articles], Moscow, 1985, p 217.

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TRENDS IN FIXED CAPITAL SPHERE OF U.S. ECONOMY DESCRIBED

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 6, Jun 86 (signed to press 23 May 86) pp 13-22

[First of a series of articles by A. I. Izyumov and R. A. Mishukova:
"Reproduction of Fixed Capital in the 1980's"]

[Text] The reorganization of the investment process and its adaptation to the conditions of the new phase of technological revolution is a problem common in many respects to all of the industrially developed countries. The improvement of investment policy is known to have been assigned a fundamental role in the program for the accelerated development of the Soviet economy. In this connection, a study of problems in the reproduction of fixed capital in the United States could be of interest.

Fixed capital, along with labor resources, is a major factor of economic growth. Fixed capital (including residential fixed capital) now accounts for over 85 percent of the value of reproduced national wealth in the United States.¹ As an embodiment of the main element of the means of production--the means of labor--fixed capital plays a tremendous role in the process of social reproduction. "Economic eras," K. Marx wrote, "are distinguished not by what is produced, but by how and by what means labor is produced."²

By the middle of the 1970's the need for the extensive renewal of fixed capital was distinctly felt in the American economy. This need was partially due to the physical aging of much of the means of production which had been put in operation during the strongest postwar investment "wave" of 1961-1967 and had already reached the limits of its service life--from 8 to 10 years for active elements of fixed capital.

A more important role, however, was played by accelerated obsolescence. It was due primarily to the abrupt change in the pricing system following the energy crisis of 1973-1974. The rising prices of energy and raw materials made the use of the most power- and material-intensive equipment unprofitable and thereby depreciated it. Another important reason for the accelerated obsolescence was the stronger foreign competition in the world market and the domestic U.S. market. Finally, this was the time when equipment models of the new generation made their appearance both in the United States and abroad--machine tools and machining complexes equipped with microprocessors and much more productive than ordinary equipment.

The combination of all these factors led to a situation in which the technological and sectorial structure of U.S. fixed capital which had taken shape by the middle of the 1970's ceased to correspond to the new conditions of economic development.

To prevent the further decline of profits and stop the advance of foreign competitors, American corporations had to quickly accomplish the renewal of all major equipment and replace it with more efficient and economical equipment.

There were serious difficulties in the mass-scale renewal of fixed capital, however, the main ones being the inflationary rise in the prices of equipment and industrial construction and the reduction of corporate financial resources due to the prolonged decline of the profit margin. Under these conditions, only the industries and corporations benefited by these market conditions could accomplish the extensive retooling of their enterprises. As a result, by the beginning of the 1980's the large-scale renewal and structural reorganization of fixed capital in the United States had not been completed.

These were the reasons for the distinctive features of capital reproduction in the American economy in the 1980's. The present state of fixed capital in the United States and problems in its accumulation will be examined in detail in this article. The article will focus on structural changes determining the direction and prospects of American economic development in the current decade.

Volume and Dynamics of Fixed Capital

On 1 January 1984 the cumulative value of fixed capital in the United States was 5,560,100,000,000 dollars (in 1972 prices).³ Fixed production capital accounted for 68 percent, or 3.783 trillion dollars, and buildings and installations accounted for 32 percent, or 1,777,100,000,000 dollars. Most of the fixed capital was concentrated in the private sector of the economy. Private firms and individuals own approximately 65 percent of the production capital and 97 percent of the fixed residential capital in the country. Besides this, the private sector controls much of the fixed capital legally owned and leased by the government.

The data in Table 1 illustrate the decline of the average annual rate of increase in private fixed production capital in the United States in the 1970's and 1980's. Whereas the rate was 4.2 percent in 1969-1973, it was 3.7 percent in 1973-1979 and 3.9 percent in 1979-1983. The rate of increase in fixed capital in the form of residential buildings declined more sharply: from 4.6 percent in 1969-1973 to 2.6 percent in 1973-1979 and 2 percent in 1979-1983. The rates also declined in the public sector: They were 5/7ths of the rates at the beginning of the 1980's. The higher absolute rate of increase in capital in the private sector secured the continuation of the tendency toward its proportional growth in total national fixed capital (from 76.2 percent in 1973 to 78.3 percent in 1983).

One of the main reasons for these changes was the long-term reduction in the workload of production capacities. In the processing industry this indicator

fell from an average of 84.9 percent in the 1960's to 81.8 percent in 1971-1976 and 78.1 percent in 1977-1983. Furthermore, companies usually do not put new production capacities in operation until the workload of existing ones reaches at least 80 percent.

Table 1. Average Annual Rate of Increase in Fixed Production Capital in U.S. Economy, %

<u>Fixed capital</u>	<u>1960-66</u>	<u>1966-69</u>	<u>1969-73</u>	<u>1973-79</u>	<u>1979-83</u>
Production capital in					
private sector	3.7	4.7	4.2	3.7	3.9
Buildings and facilities	3.5	3.9	3.4	2.6	3.0
Machines and equipment	3.9	5.7	5.1	4.9	4.7
Housing in private sector	3.1	2.8	4.6	2.6	2.0
Fixed capital in public					
sector*	3.6	3.4	2.5	2.0	1.8
Buildings and facilities	4.0	3.9	2.9	2.0	1.4
Machines and equipment	2.5	1.3	1.0	2.1	3.0

* Including fixed capital for military use.

Calculated according to data in SURVEY OF CURRENT BUSINESS, February 1981, pp 57-67; October 1982, pp 33-36; August 1983, pp 62-65; August 1984, pp 54-56.

The reduced load of production capacities in the United States was connected primarily with the more frequent and more severe economic crises of the 1970's and 1980's. Besides this, stronger foreign competition in the world and domestic U.S. markets lowered the demand for many American products. As a result, the load of production capacities in the industries which had lost their position of technological leadership, such as the automotive industry, ferrous metallurgy and the rubber industry, had fallen to 50 percent or below by the beginning of the 1980's.

In combination with the increase in manpower, the slower growth of the physical volume of fixed capital resulted in a sharp decrease in the growth rate of the capital-labor ratio. Whereas the volume of capital per worker in the private sector increased by an average of 3.9 percent a year in 1966-1970, the figure was 2.2 percent in 1971-1975 and only 0.4 percent in 1976-1980. There was even an absolute decrease in this ratio in some industries--construction, transportation and mining.⁴ In combination with the intensification of cyclical crises and several other factors, the slower rise in the capital-labor ratio lowered the growth rate of the productivity of live labor and led to the corresponding progressive decline of the capital-output ratio: There was a decrease of 24 percent in the average annual indicator in the U.S. economy between the 1965-1969 and 1980-1984 periods.⁵

In addition to the declining load of production capacities, the accelerated withdrawal of fixed capital was an important cause of its slower growth in the second half of the 1970's and the beginning of the 1980's.

In the 1950's and 1960's the withdrawal coefficient (calculated as the proportion accounted for by fixed capital withdrawn during the year in the total value at the beginning of the year) fluctuated within an extremely limited range: between 3.8 percent and 4.2 percent.⁶ The figure began to rise in 1976, and in 1983 it reached its postwar maximum--4.6 percent. This was mainly due to the accelerated withdrawal of machines and equipment, for which the withdrawal coefficient in the 1950's and 1960's was 6.3 percent (as compared to 2.3 percent for buildings and installations) but had reached 7.2 percent in 1983 (as compared to 2.1 percent for buildings and installations).

It is significant that the actual scales of this process in the 1970's and 1980's were even greater. The official methods used to determine the scales of fixed capital withdrawal are based on the conditional and invariable service lives of various elements and do not include, as government experts themselves admit, "the mass withdrawal of capital during periods of economic crisis."⁷ It is no secret, however, that American corporations divested themselves of much of their equipment during the economic crises of 1974-1975 and 1980-1982, particularly the power-intensive equipment which became unprofitable after the abrupt rise in oil prices in 1973 and 1979. This is corroborated by the revision of the index of production capacities in industry by the U.S. Federal Reserve System in August 1983. During the process of this revision, the existing quantity of production capacities was reduced by 2.5 percent.

The accelerated withdrawal of the means of labor leads, all other conditions being equal, to a situation in which an increasingly high percentage of gross investments must be used for their replacement: Whereas this was the designation of 45 percent of all investments in 1973, the figure was 50 percent in 1979 and 58 percent in 1983.⁸

Therefore, a distinctive feature of the reproduction of fixed capital in the United States today is the tendency of processes of replacement and modernization to prevail over the process of the expansion of existing means of labor. This tendency is corroborated by changes in the index of production capacities. This index rose by only 9.2 percent in the U.S. processing industry between 1980 and 1984, whereas the rise was 19.4 percent in the first half of the 1970's and 22 percent in the first half of the 1960's.⁹

In addition to these indicators, the coefficient of renewal, calculated as the relationship of annual gross investments to the cost of fixed capital at the end of the year, is an important distinction in reproduction. This coefficient indicates the speed with which new means of labor are incorporated in total fixed capital and therefore serves as the key indicator of the intensity of its reproduction.

An analysis of the dynamics of this coefficient points up the accelerated process of the renewal of fixed capital in the United States in the second half of the 1970's and the subsequent deceleration of this process in 1980-1983. Between 1974 and 1979 the renewal coefficient for all fixed capital rose from 6.7 to 8.4 percent, but the coefficient for machines and equipment rose from 9.7 to 12.3 percent.¹⁰ Only once has a process of comparable duration and scales been witnessed in the United States in the postwar period--in the first half of the 1960's.

Therefore, the dynamics of the reproductive structure of fixed capital testify that the mass renewal of fixed capital and the elimination of obsolete and worn means of labor began in the second half of the 1970's. A distinctive feature of this process (in comparison to the 1960's) was its progression under the conditions of relatively weaker, and not stronger, investment activity. In other words, it was generated primarily not by an "investment boom," but by changes in the reproductive structure of investments. This is precisely the reason for the intensification of the reproduction of fixed capital combined with lower growth rates.

The process of capital renewal had not been completed by the beginning of the 1980's, however, because it was interrupted by the protracted cyclical crisis of 1980-1982. The renewal of fixed capital was sharply curtailed during the period of crisis: Between 1979 and 1982 the renewal coefficient for all fixed capital fell from 8.4 to 4.2 percent, and the indicator for machines and equipment fell from 12.3 to 9.5 percent. The incomplete process of renewal affected the average age of fixed production assets in the country. Whereas it had decreased from 12 years to 10.3 years between 1960 and 1970, or by 14.2 percent, it remained virtually constant between 1970 and 1983 and even increased from 13.5 to 14.3 years in the case of industrial facilities. In the processing industry, however, where the renewal process was more intense, there was a tendency toward a decrease in the average age of fixed capital in the late 1970's and early 1980's. Within a fairly short period, between 1975 and 1983, it decreased from 9.4 to 9 years. This reflected not only the lower percentage of passive elements of fixed capital, but also the accelerated replacement of equipment due to the introduction of microprocessors, the rising cost of energy and the intensification of international competition.

The renewal of fixed capital in the United States was accelerated once again after the end of the economic crisis of 1980-1982. One of the main reasons was the "investment boom" in 1983, and particularly in 1984 (which will be discussed in greater detail in the second article). The shortage of statistics at this time precludes a precise assessment of the effects of the investment boom on the formation of fixed capital, but there is no question that the rapid growth of capital investments during the period of economic recovery in 1983-1985 promoted the accelerated renewal of fixed capital and a further decrease in its average age.

In spite of this, the United States is still lagging behind its main competitors in the speed of fixed capital renewal. In Japan, for example, the average age of fixed capital is now around 7 years, as compared to 10 in the United States.¹¹

During the second half of the 1980's the growth rate of fixed capital, according to American experts, could rise. The rate for the decade as a whole, however, will be lower than in the 1970's and certainly lower than in the 1960's. For example, according to a Data Resources forecast, the average annual rate of increase in private fixed capital will be 3.3 percent in 1980-1989 as compared to 3.4 percent in 1970-1979 and 4.7 percent in 1960-1969. The Data Resources experts anticipate a higher rate (3.6 percent a year on the average) of increase in fixed capital in the 1990's.¹²

Technological Structure

The late 1970's and the first half of the 1980's were marked by significant changes in the technological structure of fixed capital. The tendency toward the proportional increase in machines and equipment continued in these years. As Table 2 illustrates, the proportion accounted for by them in all private production fixed capital in the country rose from 46.5 percent to 49.1 percent between 1973 and 1984. The indicator rose more perceptibly in the processing industry than in other sectors of the economy, and in agriculture the technological structure of fixed capital remained virtually the same.

Table 2. Technological Structure of Fixed Capital in Private Sector of U.S. Economy, Excluding Residential Fixed Capital (on 1 January), %

<u>Categories</u>	<u>1966</u>	<u>1973</u>	<u>1984</u>
Total fixed capital	100.0	100.0	100.0
Machines and equipment	43.7	46.5	49.1
Buildings and facilities	56.3	53.5	50.9
Fixed capital in processing industry			
Machines and equipment	53.0	57.4	65.8
Buildings and facilities	47.0	42.6	34.2
Fixed capital in agriculture			
Machines and equipment	55.8	55.2	56.9
Buildings and facilities	44.2	44.8	43.1
Fixed capital in other sectors			
Machines and equipment	38.8	41.8	44.8
Buildings and facilities	61.2	58.2	55.2

Calculated according to data in SURVEY OF CURRENT BUSINESS, February 1981, pp 57-67; August 1983, p 62; "Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1985," p 525.

In general, the change in the technological structure of fixed capital in favor of machines and equipment reflects a progressive tendency toward a higher percentage of active elements, but this tendency is now a result of the objective laws of technical progress and of factors connected with the intensification of the contradictions of capitalist reproduction in the United States in the 1970's and 1980's. American corporations facing adverse conditions for the sale of their products reduce new industrial construction and concentrate on the renewal of existing machines and equipment, especially through the incorporation of the latest labor-saving technology.

An important role in the reduction of expenditures on construction has been played by the government's tax depreciation schedules, which make investments in active elements of fixed capital relatively more profitable than investments in passive elements, and by the high interest rates of the 1980's (this will be discussed in greater detail below).

A distinctive feature of the changing technological structure of fixed capital in the United States at this time is the rapid absolute and relative increase in machines of the new generation--machine tools with digital programmed control (DPC), microcomputers, robots, laser technology and flexible production systems. The results of inventories of metal working equipment provide some idea of these changes. According to these data, between 1973 and 1983 the total number of metal-cutting tools in machine building and metalworking decreased from 2.4 million to 1.7 million, or by 70 percent, but the number of metal-cutting tools with DPC increased 3.3-fold, from 27,000 to 90,000, and the proportion accounted for by them in all metal-cutting tools rose correspondingly from 1.1 to 5.3 percent (see Table 3). The supply of DPC equipment underwent even quicker growth among forging and pressing machines and welding equipment. Between 1973 and 1983 the number of the former increased eightfold and the number of the latter increased elevenfold. The proportion accounted for by these machine tools in all equipment of these types, however, is still negligible. The indicator in 1983 was 3.2 percent for forging and pressing machines and only 0.7 percent for welding equipment.

The desire to economize on labor motivates American corporations to incorporate labor-saving technology in production on a broad scale. The rapid increase in the number of industrial robots is indicative in this respect. Between 1974 and 1984 the total number of robots with programmed control increased more than tenfold, from 1,200 to 13,000.

Nevertheless, the United States is still lagging behind its main competitor, Japan, in the total number of robots, including all types, from simple manipulators to the "intellectual" machines of the latest generation. According to available data, by the beginning of 1985 Japan had 34,000 industrial robots as compared to the 13,000 in the United States. The number of robots is expected to reach 327,000 in Japan and 100,000 in the United States by 1989.¹³

Microprocessors, computers and robot technology have become the key links of modern technological processes. So-called flexible production systems have been established on this basis. At the beginning of 1986 there were 47 such systems, worth a total of 450 million dollars, in U.S. industry.¹⁴

An important feature of the equipment inventory in the 1980's was the rapid increase in imported foreign equipment. Between 1970 and 1983 the value of imported machines and equipment rose from 4 billion dollars to 40 billion. Whereas imports did not account for more than 8 percent of the new machines and equipment purchased by American corporations prior to the middle of the 1970's, the figure was 12 percent in 1980, 18 percent in 1983, and by 1985, according to data in the American press, they already constituted one-fourth of all purchases of equipment within the country.¹⁵ Imports of machine tools and forging and pressing equipment with DPC have demonstrated a particularly high rate of growth. Between 1977 and 1983 the proportion accounted for by foreign items in the equipment used in the processing industry rose from 17 to 36 percent.¹⁶

Table 3. Metalworking Equipment in U.S. Machine Building (units)

<u>Categories</u>	<u>1973</u>	<u>1983</u>
Metal-cutting tools	2,362,263	1,702,833
Tools with DPC	26,695	89,651
Machining centers with DPC	14,728	24,003
Forging and pressing machines	703,297	489,921
Machines with DPC	1,869	15,519
Welding equipment	498,002	453,040
Equipment with DPC	275	2,928
Automatic assembly units	17,290	18,108
Units with DPC	300	2,928
Plastic molding machines	380,399	354,529
Monitoring and testing machines and equipment	59,872	69,261
Heat processing equipment	70,765	54,920
Drying ovens	58,577	49,265
Finishing and cleaning equipment	146,013	142,004

AMERICAN MACHINIST, November 1973, p SR-2; November 1983, p 114.

Sectorial Structure

In addition to the changes in the reproductive and technological structure, there have also been significant changes in the sectorial structure of fixed capital. These changes reflect the direction of the overall structural reorganization of the American economy in the 1970's and 1980's to adapt it to the new conditions of development. The dominant factors of this reorganization--the acceleration of scientific and technical progress in the machine-building branches and the declining demand for the products of traditional industries--predetermined the nature of changes in the sectorial structure of fixed capital.

The data in Table 4 reflect the changed sectorial structure of fixed capital in the processing industry. As these data show, the most rapid increase in this capital in the second half of the 1970's and the beginning of the 1980's took place in four branches of the machine-building complex--general machine building, the electrical equipment industry, transport machine building and instrument building. Between 1974 and 1982 the proportion accounted for by these branches in the total amount of fixed capital in the processing industry rose from 24.2 to 27.7 percent. This rise reflected the high demand for their products, resulting, on the one hand, from the need to renew means of labor in every sector of the economy and, on the other, from the appearance of new and highly efficient equipment based on the use of microprocessor technology.

The change in the sectorial structure in favor of the machine-building complex, especially the new high technology fields, occurred primarily as a result of the declining proportional significance of traditional industries unable to withstand international competition, especially the metallurgical, textile and food industries, whose proportional significance decreased from 26.6 percent

in 1974 to 22.8 percent in 1982. Another significant factor was the increased proportional significance of the chemical industry (from 12.7 percent in 1974 to 14 percent in 1982) and the declining significance of the construction materials and printing industries. In the other industries (tobacco, timber and woodworking, furniture, pulp and paper, leather footwear and metalware production), fixed capital increased at approximately the same rate as in the processing industry as a whole during this period, as a result of which their proportional significance did not change perceptibly.

Table 4. Sectorial Structure of Fixed Capital in U.S. Processing Industry, %

<u>Branches of industry</u>	<u>1974</u>	<u>1978</u>	<u>1982</u>
Food	9.7	9.4	8.9
Tobacco	0.5	0.5	0.5
Textile	3.7	3.5	3.2
Timber and woodworking	3.0	3.0	3.0
Furniture	0.9	0.9	0.9
Pulp and paper	6.4	6.4	6.5
Printing	4.3	4.1	3.9
Chemical	12.7	13.8	13.9
Petroleum refining	6.4	6.3	6.2
Rubber and plastics production	3.3	3.4	3.4
Leather footwear	0.4	0.3	0.3
Construction materials production	4.6	4.4	4.3
Metallurgical	13.2	12.2	10.7
Metalware production	5.6	5.6	5.6
General machine building	7.7	8.2	9.2
Electrical equipment and radioelectronics	5.9	6.1	6.8
Transport machine building	8.7	8.7	9.5
Instrument building	1.9	2.0	2.1
Other branches	1.1	1.2	1.1
Processing	100.0	100.0	100.0

Calculated according to data in "U.S. Industrial Outlook 1984," pp A4-A14.

In the second half of the 1980's the mass incorporation of microprocessor technology and the more intense militarization of the U.S. economy will probably lead to the further redistribution of fixed capital in favor of machine-building branches. The accelerated growth of fixed capital in the services sphere is also anticipated in connection with the mass renewal of office equipment.

The Role of Government

Any description of the present features of the reproduction of fixed capital in the United States would be incomplete without some mention of the influence exerted by the economic activities of the federal administration and state and local government agencies.

The government influences the accumulation of fixed capital through several channels, the most important of which are the government's own investment activity and its tax depreciation and monetary policies.

In the 1970's and 1980's the average annual volume of government investments in the economy has ranged between 40 and 50 billion dollars (in constant 1972 prices). Most of the amount is used for infrastructural construction projects (highways and railroads, railroad stations, communication systems and equipment and public utilities) and buildings for public use (hospitals and academic institutions). This kind of investment program calls for high proportional expenditures on passive elements of fixed capital, and this, in turn, presupposes a high proportion of buildings and facilities in the total quantity of government fixed capital for civilian use. According to data for 1 January 1984, the proportion was 90.3 percent, while machines and equipment accounted for only 9.7 percent.¹⁷

Much of the government fixed capital in the United States is used for military purposes--military installations and combat equipment. In 1979 they accounted for 56.5 percent of all the fixed capital belonging to the federal government, and 4 years later the figure had risen to 58.6 percent as a result of the Reagan Administration's militarist programs. The figure is expected to rise again in 1985-1988 and the absolute volume of government-financed civilian construction is expected to display a continued decrease.

One feature of the government regulation of the capital reproduction process in the United States is the active use of indirect forms of regulation, especially fiscal measures. With the use of an accelerated amortization schedule, the government has regularly stimulated the renewal of fixed capital in the private sector throughout the postwar period. In this way, by transferring the tax burden from corporations to the laboring public, it has aided the corporations directly in the financing of investments.

The amortization laws were more advantageous for fixed capital with a short service life--machines and equipment. The result of this policy was the creation of an artificial gap between the growth rates of the active and passive elements of fixed capital, which American economists believe had a negative effect on its technological structure.¹⁸

New and much more advantageous amortization laws have been in effect in the United States since 1981. Their basic premises were set forth in the Economic Recovery Tax Act passed by Congress in 1981 at the request of the Reagan Administration.

The new legislation reduced the official service life of capital equipment radically. It defined the following average terms of depreciation: 3 years for passenger cars, trucks and special equipment; 5 years for other types of equipment and machinery, including agricultural; 10-15 years for long-term public facilities; 15 years for the majority of buildings. According to earlier legislation, most of the cost of equipment in the processing industry was written off in 5-15 years, and the cost of buildings was written off in 32-43 years.¹⁹

In 1982 the Reagan Administration was pressured by the Congress to cancel some of the privileges granted to corporations, but the laws in effect at this time are still the most generous in U.S. history as far as business is concerned. The actual tax rate of corporations declined sharply as a result of the implementation of all of the provisions of the Economic Recovery Tax Act. In absolute terms, this law saved private business 5 billion dollars in taxes in 1981, 13 billion in 1982 and 60 billion in 1983. If this legislation remains in effect, the actual tax rate on corporate profits in 1986 will be only 16 percent, as compared to 35 percent in 1980 and 39 percent in 1977.

The substantial privileges granted to corporations did not bring about any perceptible increase in investments in 1981 and 1982 because they were completely neutralized by the underloading of production capacities and the low gross profit norm in the private sector. Their stimulating role grew stronger later, as the American economy emerged from the cyclical crisis, and this led to the "investment boom" of 1983 and 1984.

In contrast to fiscal policy measures, the government's current monetary policy is having a primarily negative effect on fixed capital because it is keeping interest rates high. The restrictive policy of the U.S. central bank, the Federal Reserve System, and the continued existence of gigantic budget deficits are expected to keep interest rates relatively high in the United States until the end of the 1980's.

FOOTNOTES

1. Calculated according to data in "Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1984," Wash., 1984, p 479.
2. K. Marx and F. Engels, "Works," vol 23, p 191.
3. Including fixed capital for military use. Calculated according to data in SURVEY OF CURRENT BUSINESS, August 1984, pp 54-56.

The fixed capital in American statistics includes machine tools, machines, equipment of various types, industrial and commercial buildings and facilities, communication equipment, buildings and facilities for the service sphere and infrastructure, housing and transport vehicles used in production and the military equipment and installations owned by the government. A distinction is drawn between fixed non-residential capital and fixed residential capital. In accordance with the established practice in our economic literature, in this article the first category of fixed capital will be called production capital and the second will be called non-production fixed capital. It is noteworthy that the interpretation of the term "fixed production capital" in American economic terminology is much broader than in Soviet statistics. In particular, it includes bridges, highways, hotel, store and hospital buildings and equipment, and other categories defined as non-production capital in Soviet statistics (for more detail, see "Vosproizvodstvo obshchestvennogo produkta SShA" [The Reproduction of the U.S. National Product], Moscow, 1966, pp 318-320;

A. F. Revenko, "Promyshlennaya statistika SShA" [U.S. Industrial Statistics], Moscow, 1971, p 211).

4. "Economic Report of the President, 1983," Wash., 1983, p 79.
5. For more about the dynamics and factors of the return on capital in the United States, see SSHA: EPI, 1984, No 11--Ed.
6. Calculated by the authors on the basis of private fixed production capital (in constant 1972 prices).
7. "U.S. Industrial Outlook, 1984," Wash., 1984, p A-3.
8. The reproductive structure of investments will be discussed in greater detail in the second article.
9. Calculated according to data in "Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1985," Wash., 1985, p 757.
10. Calculated by the authors.
11. MEMO, 1985, No 11, p 124.
12. DATA RESOURCES U.S. LONG-TERM REVIEW, Fall 1982, p 1.4.
13. OECD OBSERVER, July 1983, p 11; INDUSTRIAL ROBOT, 1985, No 3, p 84.
14. "U.S. Industrial Outlook, 1986," Wash., 1986, p 21-5.
15. THE NEW YORK TIMES, 3 June 1984; 3 December 1984; FEDERAL RESERVE BULLETIN, April 1985, p 193.
16. "U.S. Industrial Outlook, 1985," Wash., 1985, p 21-2.
17. Calculated according to data in SURVEY OF CURRENT BUSINESS, February 1981, p 67; August 1984, p 57.
18. "Public Policy and Capital Formation," Wash., 1981, vol II, pp 163-175.
19. For a more detailed description of these reforms, see G. N. Naydenov, "Vosproizvodstvo osnovnogo kapitala i tsiklicheskiye razvitiye ekonomiki SShA" [Fixed Capital Reproduction and the Cyclical Development of the U.S. Economy], Moscow, 1985, pp 64-75.

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U.S. POLICIES, ATTITUDE TOWARD REGIONAL CONFLICTS ASSAILED

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 6, Jun 86 (signed to press 23 May 86) pp 23-33

[Article by V. A. Kremenyuk: "The United States in Regional Conflicts"]

[Text] The acts of armed aggression the United States committed against Libya, which were preceded by a lengthy period of hostile anti-Libyan actions by Washington, its attacks on Nicaragua and its invasion of Grenada, Israel's piracy in Lebanon, the RSA's provocations in southern Africa, the chronic tension in the Persian Gulf and the continuous infiltration of Afghanistan by counterrevolutionary gangs--these and many other events in different regions are causing the general exacerbation of the international situation. Regional conflicts are becoming an increasingly dangerous source of tension.

The Soviet Union and other socialist states have repeatedly underscored the seriousness of these international problems. They have advocated the immediate resolution of existing conflicts and the prevention of new ones in Asia, Africa and Latin America. The statement adopted by the Warsaw Pact members in Sofia on 23 October 1985 says that "any local conflict in today's tense international atmosphere could turn into a confrontation of large and even global dimensions."¹ The goal of the Soviet Union, the statement by General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee M. S. Gorbachev of 15 January 1986 says, "is not the escalation of regional conflicts, but their elimination through collective efforts on a just basis, and the sooner the better."² "The disastrous situation in the developing countries is the biggest world problem. It is here, and not anywhere else, that the real sources of many conflicts in Asia, Africa and Latin America can be found," the political report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 27th party congress noted. "This is the truth, no matter what kind of superb lies the ruling circles in the imperialist nations might invent about the 'hand of Moscow' to justify their own neocolonial policy and global ambitions.... We are in favor of a more active collective search for ways of defusing the conflicts in the Near and Middle East, Central America, southern Africa and all of the seething regions on our planet. The interests of common security urgently demand this."³

These matters were discussed at the Soviet-American summit meeting in Geneva on 19-21 November 1985. At that meeting, however, the directly opposed approaches of the two countries to the causes and methods of eliminating such conflicts were corroborated.

Washington has persisted in its attempts to blame them on the "export of revolution" and "imposition of an alien ideology." The Soviet point of view was expressed by M. S. Gorbachev at a press conference in Geneva: "Tension and conflicts in regions and even wars between different states in some part of the world are rooted in the past and in the present socioeconomic conditions of these countries and regions."⁴ The Soviet side placed special emphasis on the fact that the allegation that all of these conflicts are engendered by East-West rivalry is false and extremely dangerous.

This precise approach, however, has become one of the distinctive features of Washington's foreign policy.

The present conflicts in different parts of the world are mainly the result of the national liberation struggle of the people of former colonial and dependent countries. In some cases this is obvious to anyone--in southern Africa, for example. In others the nature of the conflicts is masked by a veneer of ethnic or other contradictions, although the main cause of the conflict is essentially the struggle for self-determination, as in the case of the Palestinian Arabs' struggle to establish their own state. Sometimes the liberation nature of the struggle of people is not acknowledged by the United States because it is taking place in formally independent countries (in El Salvador, for example), but is being waged against puppet regimes dooming their people to neocolonial dependence.

It is not in Washington's interest to acknowledge these realities. Its goals are served better by the portrayal of all conflict situations as the result of the "intervention" of the USSR and the "subversive activity of communism" or its "agents." As Secretary of State A. Haig said in one of his speeches in 1981, "the American approach to the Third World should be based on the realization that this is primarily a problem engendered by the policies of the USSR."⁵

American politicians have recently made statements of this kind in more prudent terms, but their essence has not changed.

And this is not a matter of inadequate knowledge of political realities in the developing countries, but of a desire to have a doctrinally recorded pretext for intervention in their affairs under the slogan of "counteracting the intervention of the USSR." This slogan is used to justify interference in the affairs of independent countries everywhere, interference which has become part of the "new globalism" of Washington's foreign policy line.

The continuous campaign to escalate tension in the southern Mediterranean, which the Reagan Administration has been conducting since 1981, was "crowned" by American aviation's piratical raids on Libyan cities. In this way, the U.S. administration deliberately created a regional seat of tension in the hope of pressuring the Arab countries, its West European allies and the socialist countries on the pretext of "struggle against terrorism."

As a TASS statement of 26 March of this year in connection with the U.S. act of aggression against Libya noted, "whatever false pretexts Washington may resort to at this time, they cannot justify the piratical nature of its

behavior. This is an obvious case of an unconcealed policy of state terrorism, contempt for the UN Charter and the common standards of international law, an attempt to impose its own will on other people by force of arms and to destabilize the situation in states choosing the path of independent development.... Washington is obviously trying to maintain and increase tension in world affairs and to prevent the improvement of the international situation."⁶

In recent months the U.S. political leadership has repeatedly tried to exacerbate the problem of regional conflicts. President Reagan focused attention on this in his speech at the 40th session of the UN General Assembly on 23 October 1985. Later, on 14 March of this year, he sent Congress a special message on the issue of regional conflicts, in which he again tried to put all of the blame for conflicts in various regions and for the tension engendered by them on the USSR and to depict this as "an obstacle impeding the fundamental improvement of Soviet-American relations." In the flood of propaganda rhetoric filled with assertions of the American desire to "promote democracy and freedom" throughout the world, the President of the United States did not touch upon the real essence of the problem, which consists, as Secretary of Defense C. Weinberger frankly admitted back in 1982, in the U.S. goal of striking at the Soviet Union's most vulnerable spots, "wherever they may exist."⁷

Weinberger's Interpretation of "Horizontal Escalation"

When C. Weinberger explained the basic premises of the Reagan Administration's military doctrine to the Congress on 8 February 1982, he said that the preparation of the armed forces for broader military confrontations with the socialist world would be accomplished with the aid of the selective use of force in any region where this would be to the United States' advantage. This was called the theory of "horizontal escalation."

The term "escalation" is closely associated with the works of the late American theorist H. Kahn. In his work "On Escalation," published at the height of Washington's adventure in Vietnam, H. Kahn proposed a U.S. approach to regional conflicts entailing the gradual buildup of the scales and nature of intervention, to keep the enemy in a constant state of anticipation of the use of force in increasingly dangerous forms, to the point of an exchange of nuclear strikes or even total nuclear war.⁸ This theory was called "vertical escalation."

This theory became obsolete when military-strategic parity was established between the USSR and United States and after the U.S. defeat in Vietnam (where the theory of "vertical escalation" served as the basis of Washington's politico-military planning).

In the first half of the 1970's a policy of "controlling conflicts" was adopted in Washington. It did not deny the formal possibility of Soviet-American agreements on the need to "demonstrate restraint" and on the impermissibility of conflicts or situations "capable of escalating international tension,"⁹ but it consisted mainly in an active search for unilateral advantages for the United States. It was reflected, first of all, in attempts at the arbitrary interpretation of the commitments the USSR had accepted in

joint Soviet-American documents as some kind of "refusal" to support the national liberation movement; secondly, in attempts to keep the Soviet Union out of the settlement of conflicts and, conversely, to increase the role of the United States. This was the specific aim of H. Kissinger's "shuttle diplomacy" in the Middle East in 1974 and 1975.

Furthermore, the United States did not give up intervention in the affairs of independent states (the overthrow of the Popular Unity government in Chile in 1973, the assassination of M. Rahman and the military coup in Bangladesh in 1975, etc.) or the traditional method of "managing conflicts" with the use of force or threats of its use. This was demonstrated at the time of the Arab-Israeli war of 1973, when the United States announced that its strategic forces were in a state of heightened combat readiness to warn the Soviet Union not to give any direct assistance to the Arab victims of Israeli aggression.

Washington's policy on regional conflicts became much tougher under the Carter Administration. Although this administration called itself an advocate of the "settlement of conflicts," it actually made continuous attempts to gain unilateral advantages for the United States. In particular, in 1977 and 1978 the USSR and the United States were conducting talks and consultations on the settlement of the Middle East conflict, the limitation of military activity in the Indian Ocean and the reduction of weapon shipments to third countries. If the United States had displayed any serious intention to achieve stabilization in different parts of the world, any of these talks could have helped to strengthen international security. It later became obvious that Washington's position on these matters was dictated by the desire to gain unilateral concessions from the Soviet Union in the strategic arms talks, and when this did not happen the system of Soviet-American talks, with the exception of START, was destroyed through the fault of the Washington administration.

It is significant that when the administration consented to negotiate these matters with the USSR, it was simultaneously developing the means of military intervention in regional conflicts. In summer 1977 a document was prepared by the White House staff and later became known, after it was signed by President Carter in August of that year, as Presidential Directive 18 (PD-18). This directive envisaged the creation of the "rapid deployment force" (RDF). Until the end of the 1970's U.S. policy continued to emphasize confrontation with the USSR in regional conflicts. Until summer 1980--that is, until Directive 59 (on "limited nuclear war") was signed--Washington officials seemed to be drawing a clear distinction between possible confrontation on the strategic and regional levels; Directive 59 eliminated even this distinction.

Therefore, "horizontal escalation" did not emerge from a vacuum. For almost a decade, despite the lessons of the war in Vietnam, detente and the realities of strategic parity, official Washington policy consistently advanced toward the revival of the system of global confrontation on the strategic and regional levels.

This was done in the expectation that the revival of global confrontation, however it might jeopardize international peace, would give Washington certain dividends by allowing it to "rack up points" in its military and political competition with the USSR without the risk of a direct conflict on the strategic level, would aid in the defeat of leading forces in the national liberation movement, would intimidate the emerging states, particularly those with important crude resources (it was no coincidence that the Persian Gulf zone was announced as one of the first locations of RDF deployment when Carter was still in the White House) and, finally, would have a "disciplinary" effect on the United States' allies among the developed powers by reminding them of their need to rely on American military potential for access to important raw materials.

All of these motives are present in the Reagan Administration's politico-military doctrine. It proceeds from the assumption that there is no corner of today's world where the interests of the two powers do not conflict, either directly or indirectly, either overtly or covertly. According to the administration's logic, this means that any conflict should be viewed as a sphere of competition, regardless of the circumstances giving rise to it.

The Regional Subsystem of Confrontation

The theory of "horizontal escalation" was not simply another declaration of intentions in Washington's aggressive preparations. It became the basis for a projected series of undertakings to build up U.S. military potential: the reinstatement of the previously shelved plans for battleships of the "Iowa" class, the increase in RDF personnel and the creation of the Central Command (CENTCOM) in the Indian Ocean and the Southern Command in the Caribbean.¹⁰ It served as the basis for military and diplomatic actions: the occupation of Grenada, the sending of the contingent of American Marines to Lebanon in 1982, the increase in aggressive actions against Libya and Nicaragua and the intensification of U.S. subversive activity in Afghanistan and southern Africa. Besides this, the theory served as the analytical basis for a massive propaganda campaign intended to portray U.S. interventionist policy to the American and world public as a response to the alleged "expansionist behavior" of the USSR.

A striking element of a report on "naval strategy" (in January 1986) by Admiral J. Watkins, chief of naval operations, was the definition of the U.S. strategic goal as the "ability to stabilize and control crises in Third World countries." This presupposes the continued buildup of U.S. interventionist potential for interference in the affairs of developing countries and more intense preparations for military confrontation with the USSR, which, according to the author of the report, could be the result of this interference.

Through Washington's efforts, the issue of regional conflicts has become one of the sources of international friction and instability. One of the most serious consequences of this policy was the development of a regional subsystem of confrontation between the USSR and United States. For many years, the United States has wanted to "test the strength" of the two world systems on the regional level. Back in the late 1950's, T. Schelling, renowned American

expert on conflicts, concluded, with a view to the development of the USSR's defensive potential and, in particular, its acquisition of ICBM's, that it would be desirable to move the military confrontation between the two countries to the "periphery," because the possibility of winning a nuclear world war was "becoming increasingly uncertain."¹¹

In combination with the strategic arms race, the attempts of U.S. politico-military strategists to organize this kind of "test of strength" between the two world systems on the regional level was counterbalanced for a long time by the understanding that this kind of confrontation could not encompass the entire world and would be impossible in principle, due to limited resources, even for a power as great as the United States, and should therefore be concentrated only in certain "indicative" regions (in Indochina, for example). In spite of the U.S. defeat in Vietnam, the Reagan Administration rejected this "limited" approach and announced its intention to oppose the socialist world in all conflict situations, from Central America to Indochina, including the conflicts in the Middle East, southern Africa, the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean.

Scientific centers working for the administration did much to promote this line in U.S. politico-military strategy with their research. In particular, a plan called "Future Conflicts" and compiled in the first half of the 1980's by the Georgetown University Center for Strategic and International Studies directly advised the administration to regard conflicts of "low intensity" (without the use of weapons of mass destruction) as the basic form of the military "test of strength" between the USSR and the United States within the foreseeable future, and stated that the United States should therefore prepare for struggle in various parts of the world to oppose the Soviet Union with organized and well-planned "resistance."¹²

If these recommendations are compared to what American researchers had to say about the same matter in the 1960's, at the height of the intervention in Indochina, many points in common can be found: the same issue of the "struggle for the Third World," the "counteraction of the Soviet threat," the suppression of "insurgent movements" and so forth. But 20 years later, in the new strategic and international political situation of today, these recommendations and the official policy premises based on them sound completely different, adding much more sweeping and dangerous implications to the entire subject matter of regional conflicts.

First of all, the strategy of the "test of strength" in regional conflicts was worked out under the conditions of military-strategic parity, and any U.S. actions undertaken in regional conflicts for the purpose of gaining any kind of advantage could be interpreted as indirect attempts to change the international balance of power in the United States' own favor.

Secondly, the independent role of emerging countries in current or potential conflicts and in the resolution of common international problems is essentially ignored.

During the years since the collapse of imperialism's colonial system, however, the emerging states have become a perceptible factor in international

relations. Complex internal processes are taking place in these countries and are having different effects on the international situation. On the one hand, these states are actively striving for the relaxation of international tension, which is apparent just from the results of their votes in the United Nations and from the activities of the non-aligned movement, and this puts them in opposition to U.S. policy. On the other hand, there have been cases in which some countries have had an adverse effect on the international situation. This is attested to by the Iran-Iraq war, which has been going on continuously since 1980 and is threatening the stability of shipping in the Persian Gulf, and by the reports of the secret development of nuclear weapons in Pakistan and the participation of this country in the undeclared war against the people of Afghanistan.

Consequently, no matter how events in the emerging countries are assessed, it is obvious that the American strategy of "horizontal escalation" is not operating in a vacuum, but in zones of acute political, economic and social contradictions capable of giving rise to new conflicts, in which the United States will logically and unavoidably become involved either directly or indirectly, giving these conflicts completely different--global--implications.

In this context, it is also necessary to consider another aspect of Reagan Administration policy: the substantial increase in military assistance, representing the means of the further militarization of emerging countries.¹³

But the main thing is that the theory of "horizontal escalation" links the interests and actions of the United States in different parts of the world directly with problems in Soviet-American relations. This is not the same "linkage" of different and frequently unrelated issues that was practiced by Washington in the 1970's and that caused so much trouble in the relations between the two countries, but an attempt to combine the not always predictable course of events in different parts of the world, depending on many transitional factors, and to put these events in the context of Soviet-American relations.

As a result of Washington's policy, problems and conflicts in Soviet-American relations are fairly complex even without the addition of regional conflicts. But the Reagan Administration promoted the complication of Soviet-American relations with a subsystem of regional problems by implementing a series of politico-military undertakings based on the theory of "horizontal escalation." As a result, the state of Soviet-American relations depends not only on the situation in the sphere of bilateral contacts, but also on the next part of the world Washington might choose for a show of strength or the organization of confrontation.

Problems for American Foreign Policy

The reaction of various political forces and groups in the United States to the administration's policy line was and is varied. It goes without saying that rightwing circles applauded the "determined" and "offensive" nature of "horizontal escalation." They were particularly gratified by C. Weinberger's statement that this strategy would help to "project" U.S. strength to distant

corners of the world and would force other countries to "take U.S. interests into consideration."

But this policy aroused anxiety and alarm in much broader groups--among members of Congress, the business world and the academic community. These feelings have been expressed in Congress in the numerous battles between the administration and the House of Representatives over the financing of the gangs of "Contras" in Nicaragua. In March 1986 the House of Representatives refused the administration's request for 100 million dollars in aid to the "Contras," and this was qualified as a defeat for the administration by political analysts.

In the academic community these feelings and attitudes were apparent at a special conference on ways of reducing the risk of inadvertent war at Texas State University (Austin) on 24-25 February 1983. It was attended by such prominent experts as T. Schelling, A. George and B. Blechman and by representatives of government agencies--Lt Gen W. Hillsman, director of the Pentagon Defense Communications Agency, and Admiral B. Inman, former deputy director of the CIA. In his introductory speech, famous American physicist H. Roderick said that a world nuclear conflict could be started in the 1980's by some kind of actions by government officials which they would not expect to start a war, but since too many factors influence the situation during periods of international crises in addition to the intentions and expectations of politicians, these actions could start a global conflict.¹⁴

This statement is actually an admission of the simple fact that the risk of the start of a serious crisis for any reason, especially in connection with a regional conflict, becomes greater in an atmosphere of mutual suspicion and rivalry in the international arena. As a result, the great powers could face the danger of a direct confrontation which, after beginning on the regional level, would continue its development according to the logic of a global conflict. Furthermore, the number of scenarios of this type of escalation is endless. For example, in his article "Constraints on America's Conduct of Small Wars," Harvard University expert E. Cohen examines one of the most probable scenarios, according to which the United States will be motivated to engage in increasingly destructive forms of intervention in a regional conflict (in other words, a return to the pattern of "vertical escalation") if it should send its troops to a country in Asia, Africa or Latin America. Studying the experience of U.S. involvement in so-called "small wars" (or "conflicts of low intensity"), E. Cohen concludes that, despite the extensive campaign with regard to "horizontal escalation," the American Armed Forces (because of their emphasis on big wars--nuclear or conventional war in Europe), the government (because of the complexities of the interdepartmental and intradepartmental bureaucratic struggle) and the political mechanism (because of the notorious system of "checks and balances": the administration--the Congress--the judiciary) will be unable to adapt to "small-scale warfare."¹⁵

This means that in an atmosphere of chauvinistic feelings within the United States and tension in the international arena, the American administration will want to use increasingly destructive forms of armed force (even nuclear weapons, especially after their "miniaturization") and will thereby begin

the escalation of the conflict. It is this that will represent what American experts term the "inadvertent" start of a nuclear world war.

Other American experts have also underscored the danger of this course of events. For example, an Aspen Institute report mentions the "tendency of regional problems in the developing world to acquire the nature of East-West confrontations and lead to confrontations between the superpowers."¹⁶ Speakers at a foreign policy conference sponsored by the Stanley Foundation (Iowa) in October 1984 noted that "a confrontation of this kind in combination with the regional clashes characteristic of many parts of the developing world was regarded by the majority at the conference as the most serious threat to international peace."¹⁷

It is true that the policy of the U.S. administration, aimed at the organization of "tests of strength" with the USSR in different parts of the world, where the situation follows its own momentum and is therefore unpredictable, can make Soviet-American relations, even in such important areas as matters of war and peace, depend on the incidental patterns of the local political struggle or the insidious intentions of politicians who do not care about the long-range implications of their own actions. This kind of policy on the part of a great power, regardless of its motives, certainly cannot be called wise or farsighted and is most likely to give rise to new and dangerous problems for the country pursuing it.

The Search for a Solution

When the actual state of Soviet-American relations today is assessed, it is clear that regional problems have become an integral part of them. But in addition to the negative effects of American policy in these conflicts on the relationship between the USSR and the United States, there is also the possibility of positive solutions.

The point of view of the socialist Warsaw Pact states on this matter was expressed quite clearly in the political declaration the Political Consultative Committee adopted on 5 January 1983: This is a matter, firstly, of a search for ways of eliminating existing conflicts and preventing new ones and, secondly, of measures to keep local conflicts from turning into worldwide armed confrontations.¹⁸ The statement adopted by the Warsaw Pact members in Sofia in October 1985 expresses the same idea in more definite terms: "We must resolutely put an end to the imperialist policy of force and intervention in the internal affairs of other countries and to acts of aggression, resolve conflicts and disputes between states by peaceful means and completely respect the right of each nation to determine its own future independently."¹⁹

There are several opinions in the United States with regard to ways of keeping regional conflicts from growing into more extensive armed confrontations. There is, for example, the theory of "crisis prevention" set forth in a collective work published in 1983, "The Regulation of American-Soviet Rivalry." Its authors are aware of the exceptionally dangerous and unpredictable nature of some regional conflicts and conclude that the establishment of a crisis prevention mechanism would be the best way of achieving some degree of stability

in relations between the great powers. Furthermore, some of the authors' recommendations are quite similar to the proposals put forth by the USSR in April 1981.²¹

Another point of view is expressed in a study conducted by Harvard University experts for the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency: It is a study of the possibility of Soviet-American cooperation in the prevention of crises capable of evolving into nuclear war. The results of this study served as the basis for a work published in 1984 and coauthored by W. Ury and R. Smoke, "Beyond the Hotline: Controlling a Nuclear Crisis," and a work by W. Ury published in 1985, "Beyond the Hotline: How Crisis Control Can Prevent Nuclear War."²²

The two books are distinguished by serious concern about the instability of Soviet-American relations in a world torn asunder by contradictions and conflicts capable of escalating into nuclear war. But the authors were apparently subject to the political mood of the time and, out of the entire range of possible solutions to the problem, including the establishment of stable U.S.-USSR relations based on mutual trust, the negotiation of mutually acceptable standards and rules of behavior, and cooperation in the settlement of the most dangerous conflicts, they choose only a fairly small group of technical measures to improve the line of direct communication between Moscow and Washington and create "crisis control" centers.

The consideration of various approaches to regional conflicts within the context of Soviet-American relations by American academic experts has been accompanied by a parallel search for solutions to the same problems in Congress and in government agencies. The passage of resolutions demanding that the administration take measures to reach agreements with the USSR for the avoidance of the accidental or unauthorized start of a nuclear war during a period of acute international crisis has been discussed in Congress since 1982 on the initiative of Senator S. Nunn. A group of experts was formed to work out the details of this initiative, with its members including such prominent experts as B. Blechman, W. Hyland, W. Perry and others. As a result, the U.S. Senate passed a resolution (No 329) in February 1984 to request the administration to begin talks with the Soviet Union on the creation of the technical potential to control regional conflicts during periods of international crisis.

During the hearings on this resolution before the Committee on Foreign Relations, C. Percy, its chairman at that time, said there were two fundamental ways of reducing the risk of nuclear war: One was the negotiation of effective and verifiable arms limitation and reduction agreements and the other was the negotiation of a set of procedures securing the avoidance of an accidental or inadvertent nuclear conflict.²³

Against this background, the administration's proposals (first set forth in the so-called "Weinberger Report" to Congress in April 1983), on the creation of some kind of joint system of "crisis management" bodies with the USSR, resemble an attempt to make concessions to Congress and the public to allay their fears about the danger of slipping into a world war. An analysis of statements by President Reagan and Secretary of State Shultz on regional

conflicts and the actual U.S. policy in conflict regions, however, indicates that the general position of the American administration on these matters has not changed.

The issue of regional conflicts, the just political settlement of which, as speakers stressed at the 27th CPSU Congress, is an integral part of the establishment of a comprehensive system of international security, has been transferred by the American administration to the point where two important spheres of international relations meet: stability in relations between the USSR and the United States (and between the NATO countries and Warsaw Pact states) and the struggle between countries and various types of political forces in the Third World. And this is why it is so dangerous: The escalation of almost any regional conflict could set the entire group of contradictions in the international arena in motion and cause them to take their most extreme forms. Besides this, by transferring the issue of regional conflicts to a higher level of confrontation, the United States is minimizing the possibility of settling these conflicts with the aid of the United Nations, regional organizations and countries whose interests are being injured the most by these conflicts.

For this reason, a serious and responsible approach to the resolution of this problem, consisting in the immediate settlement of regional conflicts and the prevention of new ones, will require maximum effort to eliminate the sources of possible upheavals. It should be aimed at the resolution of these conflicts by political means and with a view to the legitimate interests of all of the parties involved, and at the prevention of their evolution into epicenters of large-scale international crises.

At the meeting in Geneva in November 1985, the leaders of the USSR and United States agreed that this aspect of the issue of regional conflicts warrants special attention. The joint Soviet-American statement says: "The two sides agreed to organize expert investigations of the possible creation of centers to reduce the nuclear danger, with a view to the development of the talks in Geneva and the matters being discussed there. They noted with pleasure that a step had recently been taken in this direction with the improvement of the Soviet-American line of direct communication."²⁴

Nevertheless, when the Soviet Union and other socialist countries take measures to keep regional conflicts from growing into larger military confrontations, they adhere to the belief that regional conflicts should be resolved on a just basis, without any interference in the internal affairs of independent countries and without any attempts to threaten them with the use of military force.

"I have no doubt," M. S. Gorbachev said when he was interviewed by REVOLUTION AFRICAINE magazine, "that if there were no American intervention in the internal affairs of other states, regional conflicts would subside and could be resolved much more simply and justly."²⁵

The USSR and the United States could reach a mutual understanding on this group of issues, but this will mean that the U.S. administration will have to make many changes in its approach to regional conflicts and acknowledge the need for their resolution in the spirit of the UN Charter.

FOOTNOTES

1. PRAVDA, 24 October 1985.
2. Ibid., 16 January 1986.
3. "Materialy XXVII syezda Kommunisticheskoy partii Sovetskogo Soyuza" [Materials of the 27th CPSU Congress], Moscow, 1986, pp 17, 70.
4. PRAVDA, 22 November 1985.
5. DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN, June 1981, p 11.
6. PRAVDA, 26 March 1986.
7. C. Weinberger, "Annual Report to the Congress. FY 1983, 8 February 1982," Wash., 1982, pp 1-16.
8. H. Kahn, "On Escalation," N.Y., 1965. Kahn's "theory of escalation" has been analyzed in depth in several works by Soviet specialists--I. L. Sheydina, V. V. Zhurkin, A. A. Kokoshin, G. A. Trofimenko and others.
9. From the document "Fundamentals of Interrelations Between the USSR and United States," in "Vneshnyaya politika Sovetskogo Soyuza i mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya. Sbornik dokumentov. 1972 g." [The Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union and International Relations. Collected Documents. 1972], Moscow, 1973, p 88.
10. The military budget for fiscal year 1985, with a projected total increase of 9.3 percent (and adjustments for inflation) in military spending, envisaged an increase of 34 percent in expenditures on the reinforcement of interventionist potential for operations in regional conflicts (C. Weinberger, "Annual Report to the Congress. FY 1985, 1 February 1984," Wash., 1984, pp 133-155, 163-164, 173-184).
11. T. Schelling, "The Strategy of Conflict," N.Y., 1970, p 253.
12. W. Taylor, S. Maaranen and G. Gong, "Strategic Responses to Conflict in the 1980's," Lexington (Mass.), 1984, p 9.
13. In 1984 the United States spent 14.4 billion dollars on these projects; in 1986 the figure was higher due to a substantial increase in military aid to Israel and Egypt (an increase of 525 million dollars in aid to both countries).
14. "Avoiding Inadvertent War: Crisis Management," edited by H. Roderick and U. Magnusson, Austin (Texas), 1983, pp 6-7.
15. E. Cohen, "Constraints on America's Conduct of Small Wars," INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, Fall 1984, pp 151-181.

16. "Managing East-West Conflict. A Framework for Sustained Engagement. Statement of the Aspen Institute International Group," N.Y., 1984, p 6.
17. "Strategy for Peace, 1984. 25th Annual U.S. Foreign Policy Conference Report. Sponsored by the Stanley Foundation, 11-13 October 1984," Muscatine (Iowa), p 15.
18. "Vneshnyaya politika Sovetskogo Soyuz a i mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya. Sbornik dokumentov. 1983 g.," Moscow, 1984, pp 13-14.
19. PRAVDA, 24 October 1985.
20. For more about this work, see SSHA: EPI, 1984, No 6, pp 120-122.
21. The proposals the USSR put forth on 27 April 1981 are widely known and have been published repeatedly in the USSR (for example, in "Sovetskaya programma mira dlya 80-kh godov v deystvii. Materialy i dokumenty" [The Soviet Program of Peace for the 1980's in Action. Papers and Documents], Moscow, 1982, pp 34-37).
22. W. Ury and R. Smoke, "Beyond the Hotline: Controlling a Nuclear Crisis," Boston, 1984; W. Ury, "Beyond the Hotline: How Crisis Control Can Prevent Nuclear War," Boston, 1985.
23. "Nuclear Risk Reduction. Hearing Before the Committee on Foreign Relations. U.S. Senate," 4 April 1984, p 1.
24. PRAVDA, 22 November 1985.
25. Ibid., 3 April 1986.

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U.S. ACCUSED OF BLOCKING CHEMICAL WEAPONS DISARMAMENT

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 6, Jun 86 (signed to press 23 May 86) pp 56-62

[Article by I. N. Shcherbakov: "Washington and Chemical Weapons"]

[Text] General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee M. S. Gorbachev's statement of 15 January 1986, in which he set forth the Soviet program for the elimination of nuclear weapons and also some fundamentally important proposals aimed at the elimination of chemical weapons in our century, signifies a new point of departure in the struggle to ban this barbarous means of mass destruction. The Soviet initiatives are significant because they put the problem of banning and eliminating chemical weapons, one of the key problems in the sphere of disarmament, into the realm of practical solutions: They propose the elimination of the weapons themselves and the industrial base for their production within the next 15 years. The issue of enterprises for their production and the effective control of their destruction has been an undecided matter for a long time in the talks on the prohibition of chemical weapons conducted within the framework of the Geneva Conference on Disarmament. In an attempt to break this Gordian knot, the USSR announced its willingness to begin negotiating procedures for the destruction of this industrial base, the announcement of the locations of chemical weapons enterprises and the cessation of their production. All of this presupposes strict control, including international on-site inspections.

The Soviet Union's new initiatives are a natural and logical result of our country's many years of consistent struggle for the complete elimination of chemical weapons. Back in 1928 the USSR was one of the first states in the world to sign the 1925 Geneva protocol prohibiting the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of bacteriological methods of warfare. In 1969, at the 24th Session of the UN General Assembly, the USSR and other socialist countries proposed a draft convention on the cessation of the production and the elimination of chemical and bacteriological weapons. At that time, however, the prohibition of this entire group of weapons of mass destruction was impossible because the United States did not want to give up its chemical arsenal. In 1971 a convention was drafted to ban only bacteriological weapons (it was ready for signing in 1972 and went into effect in 1975). In 1982 the Soviet Union submitted a detailed document to the Second Special Session of the UN General Assembly on Disarmament, "The Basic Premises

of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction," which is still, in the opinion of the majority of participants in the talks, an excellent basis for an international agreement of this kind.

These are the main milestones along the Soviet Union's journey to ban chemical weapons.

How did the United States respond to the Soviet Union's many initiatives? What is Washington's real attitude toward the problem of prohibiting chemical weapons?

It must be said that Washington has accumulated considerable "experience" in planting propagandistic stereotypes, portraying the United States as an advocate of a chemical weapons ban, in the minds of the public in its own country and abroad, especially among its closest NATO allies, in recent decades. The traditional set of propagandistic ruses includes the allegation that the United States played the "initiating" role in the prohibition of chemical weapons in the postwar years and was able to achieve the signing of the convention on the prohibition of bacteriological weapons in 1972, and that Washington had supposedly observed an unofficial "unilateral moratorium" on the production of chemical weapons since 1969 and is now actively promoting the quickest possible conclusion of an international convention. During these years, the statements by American leaders, that the 10-billion-dollar "chemical rearmament" program they announced in 1982 is supposedly a response to "Soviet superiority in chemical weapons," have also become standard propaganda cliches.

In March 1985 the U.S. Congress formed a commission headed by former Under Secretary of State W. Stoessel. All of its nine members were appointees from Pentagon lobbies. The commission's report stated that the U.S. line in the sphere of chemical weapons is supposedly dictated by a policy declared by President F. Roosevelt, the policy of "no first use of chemical weapons," and by "efforts to achieve a verifiable ban on the production and stockpiling of chemical weapons." The stepped-up U.S. efforts to intensify the potential of chemical weapons, however, are camouflaged in the report as the "maintenance of defensive measures" and "intimidation potential" in the event of a chemical attack.

As a rule, all of the speeches and statements by upper-echelon political and military leaders in the United States, from President R. Reagan to General B. Rogers, supreme allied commander of the NATO forces in Europe, are written precisely in accordance with this scenario. Secretary of Defense C. Weinberger's report to the Congress on the military budget for fiscal year 1986 was no exception, and it contained the entire set of pseudo-arguments, placing special emphasis on the United States' lack of "effective chemical defensive potential" and the need for the more intense buildup of chemical weapons under the banner of so-called modernization. In the molding of public opinion, the tone is set by American military agencies and rightwing political groups representing the mounting interest of the U.S. military-industrial complex in the production of new types of chemical weapons. As usual, references are made to the "Soviet threat." The Pentagon has published an entire series of

special brochures on this subject just in the last few years, particularly the 1985 publication "The Threat Posed by Soviet Chemical Weapons." These publications are literally larded with various lies about the "Soviet chemical threat," the alleged use of Soviet chemical weapons in Afghanistan and the "pitiful state" of American chemical potential. In spite of considerable propaganda efforts, however, the American administration has been unable to offer any proof that the United States wants "chemical disarmament" or to justify its own unrestrained buildup of the most modern types of chemical weapons, because not one of the arguments Washington has invented has survived the confrontation with reality. The legendary peacemaking role of the United States in the prohibition of chemical weapons is refuted by the facts.

It is true that the United States signed the Geneva protocol on the prohibition of the use of chemical weapons in war back in 1925, but it avoided ratifying the protocol for 50 years. It was not until 1975 that the protocol was finally ratified, in an atmosphere of universal outrage at the reports of the broad-scale use of defoliants by the U.S. Armed Forces during the war in Indochina.

The United States signed the convention on the prohibition of bacteriological weapons in 1975, after the Pentagon arrived at its conclusion about the "insufficient reliability of biological weapons as an effective deterrent."

Another fact contradicting the stereotypes created by American propaganda is the fact that in 1980 the United States unilaterally broke off the bilateral Soviet-American talks initiated by the USSR on the prohibition of chemical weapons, despite the considerable convergence noted at that time in the positions of the two sides on several important issues, including the verification of the observance of the future convention's provisions. During Senate hearings in May 1985, Senator G. Mitchell criticized the United States for walking out of the talks at a time when "considerable progress had been made and both sides had accepted the principle of on-site inspections" and accused the White House of having "no intention whatsoever to negotiate these matters seriously."

The American propaganda assertions that the United States is conducting a policy of "no first use" of chemical weapons also conflict with reality. According to the American scientific journal, BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS, during the cold war the concept of "no first use" of chemical weapons was replaced by the principle of "readiness to use chemical weapons on the orders of the President"--that is, the possibility of the first use of these barbarous weapons was admitted. The result was the extensive use of herbicides and defoliants--toxic chemicals--by the United States during the war in Indochina, causing the loss of many human lives.

The statements by American government and military officials about the observance of a so-called "unilateral moratorium" on the production of chemical weapons are also groundless. The slight decline in the production of chemical weapons in the United States by 1969 was due, as the Stoessel commission confirmed, to the completion of all Pentagon programs for chemical weapons production by that time. It then took some time to develop the new--binary--

generation of chemical weapons. Therefore, the supplementation of the American chemical arsenal and its maintenance in a state of combat readiness never ceased, and now the United States has the largest supply of chemical weapons in the world. Its basis consists of 55,000 tons of highly toxic nerve gases and 150,000 tons of chemical ammunition--more than 3 million projectiles, tens of thousands of mines and field charges, and many others. The United States has more than 10 large chemical weapon depots on its territory and in other countries, including states in Western Europe.

The thesis that U.S. military chemical potential has become obsolete, that it does not meet defense needs and that the United States is lagging behind the Soviet Union in this sphere is also splitting at the seams. During congressional hearings in May 1985, a group of senators opposing the allocation of funds to the Pentagon for the production of binary chemical weapons cited a number of convincing arguments to refute these allegations. In particular, as Senator G. Hart declared, "the United States already has huge stocks of chemical weapons ready for use, more than enough to meet the necessary defense requirements." Senators E. Kennedy, D. Pryor and others recalled Weinberger's statement in September 1983 that the American Armed Forces had enough artillery shells loaded with nerve toxins.

Washington's destructive policy line with regard to the prohibition of chemical weapons was predetermined back in the late 1960's and early 1970's by the adoption of a program to equip the U.S. Armed Forces with more effective and modern chemical ammunition--binary charges. While U.S. diplomacy continued to create the illusion of interest in the prohibition of chemical weapons at international forums on disarmament, the Pentagon stepped up the work on the development of binary ammunition. In 1965-1969 the U.S. Navy completed the engineering and preliminary testing of the Big Eye binary chemical bomb for its joint use by the Navy and Air Force. In 1976 the development of 155-mm artillery chemical shells in a binary clip (with a range of 22 km) was completed. In 1981 the development of binary weapons for multibarreled jet-propelled gun mounts (with a range of 30-50 km) began. The decision to create a "binary triad" of chemical arms was made, and a program was launched for the "chemical rearming" of the American Armed Forces.

In 1977, when the bilateral Soviet-American talks were progressing, the Pentagon began lobbying for additional allocations for the production of binary chemical weapons. Military agencies used the tried and tested method of pressuring the Congress by spreading the rumor that the American chemical arsenal was inferior to the Soviet one, and they were so successful that allocations for binary weapons research, development and testing doubled between 1977 and 1980.

The program of binary arms production promoted by the military agencies is completely consistent with the Reagan Administration's efforts to achieve military-technological superiority to the Soviet Union by re-equipping its armed forces with the most powerful and modern weapons systems.

The emphasis on the production of binary weapons stems from several technical-tactical advantages these weapons have over traditional unitary types,

especially with regard to methods of storing and transporting the binary weapons and their safe handling. By including them in its arsenal, the Pentagon hopes to expand possibilities for the operational and tactical use of chemical weapons in the theater of military operations, especially in offensive operations involving the chemical subunits of the Army and Air Force and also the Navy. The Marine Corps and naval command plans to keep binary weapons directly on military ships, aircraft carriers and carrier-based airplanes (chemical weapons were never kept on naval ships in the past because it was impossible to guarantee the safety of personnel). The new weapons are expected to increase the "flexibility and speed" of the delivery of chemical strikes.

Pentagon strategists also have a special interest in binary weapons because they offer a real chance to adapt chemical weapons to the new aggressive military-strategic concepts of the United States and NATO--the concepts of the so-called "air-land operation (or battle)" and the "deep echeloned strike" or "strike at second echelons and reserves," intended to deliver a surprise strike deep within enemy defense lines for the purpose of inflicting maximum injuries on enemy troops and achieving overwhelming superiority. According to Pentagon calculations, the binary weapons, with their longer range and heightened accuracy in comparison to unitary chemical weapons, can perform the function, assigned to chemical troops in U.S. military strategy, of delivering strikes at groups of ground troops, communication lines, command centers and airports deep within enemy defense lines. In the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the new weapons will completely solve the problem of the delivery of medium- and long-range chemical weapons for the destruction of targets deep within enemy defenses (beyond the range of artillery fire).

In addition to its plans for the binary triad, the Pentagon also hopes to mount binary weapons on "air-to-ground" missiles (with a range of up to 160 km) and on some ballistic and cruise missiles.

All of this, combined with the efforts to create new and more effective means of collective and individual personnel defense and secure personnel mobility on the battlefield under the conditions of chemical warfare, testifies that Washington strategists are beginning to assign chemical weapons a strategic role. What is more, these facts refute the allegations of the Pentagon and White House about the defensive purpose of the new type of chemical weapons and attest to the aggressive aims of American plans for the mass production of binary weapons.

As a result of the common interest of military agencies, the military-industrial complex and the White House in the production of binary chemical weapons, in February 1982 President Reagan announced the intention to launch a 10-billion-dollar program for the extensive "chemical rearming" of the U.S. Armed Forces. This program envisages the radical modernization of the military chemical arsenal and an increase in the number of chemical weapons from 3 million to 5 million. Furthermore, a sum of almost 3 billion dollars was allocated for binary weapons production, research and testing and for the construction of facilities for the production of these weapons just during the initial stage of the program. The financing of the production of binary weapons, however, is still being debated in Congress.

For several years the opponents of the "binaries" in Congress were able to block the allocation of the funds requested by the Pentagon in their entirety: After lengthy debates, funds were allocated for the construction of a new binary weapons production complex in Pine Bluff (Arkansas), with a projected yield of 70,000 weapons of various types a year, but Congress refused to finance any further work on the "binary program" in 1984 by a vote of 298 (with only 98 votes in favor of this financing).

The opposition to the administration's plans was led by a group of influential legislators headed by Senator D. Pryor. The group also included senators G. Hart, P. Simon, E. Kennedy, W. Proxmire, M. Hatfield and J. Danforth, congressmen J. Porter, D. Fascell, M. Roukema, D. Bonior, R. Kastenmeier, B. Edgar and others. They expressed the views of various social and political groups in the United States, united by extremely negative feelings about chemical weapons as something barbarous and inhuman. In the late 1960's and early 1970's these groups condemned the government for using defoliants during the aggression against Vietnam, testing chemical weapons on U.S. territory (in the states of Maryland and Utah), developing bacteriological means of warfare and so forth. Under their pressure, the United States ratified the 1925 Geneva protocol and signed the convention on the prohibition of bacteriological weapons. Other congressmen and senators affiliated with this group do not object to "chemical rearming" in principle but do believe that priority should be assigned not to the production of binary weapons, the combat effectiveness of which, in their opinion, is still not completely certain, but to the production of the latest means of the individual and collective defense of armed forces personnel against chemical attacks, the training of troops and so forth. In general, the group is not monolithic and its unity is being eroded considerably by the mounting pressure exerted on the opponents of the "binaries" by the White House and by Pentagon lobbyists. In particular, this was attested to by the composition of the new U.S. Congress, which began its work in January 1985.

The main arguments of the opponents of the "binary program" in Congress can essentially be summarized in the statement that the production of binary weapons, first of all, will give rise to a new round of the chemical arms race, will have a serious adverse effect on the talks being conducted within the framework of the Geneva Conference on Disarmament with regard to a universal ban on chemical weapons and will delay the drafting of the corresponding international convention; secondly, it will promote the spread of chemical weapons and the technology of their production to other countries, including developing states. The relative simplicity of the manufacture of binary compounds means that it could be organized at ordinary commercial chemical enterprises, without the need for any special technical safety measures, in virtually any country with the technology for the production of complex organic chemicals. Thirdly, the production of these weapons and the attempts to deploy them in Western Europe will evoke a crisis in U.S. relations with the West European NATO allies. The leaders of Greece, the Netherlands, the FRG, Norway, Belgium and Denmark, for example, have already declared that they will not allow this deployment. At a session of the NATO Council in May 1985, the defense ministers of the bloc countries refused to discuss the issue of binary weapons and their deployment. Nevertheless, the United States

is still pressuring its allies. In the middle of February this year, it convinced the NATO military committee to pass a resolution stating that the modernization of chemical weapons is "one of the main spheres of NATO activity." At the next session of the bloc council in May, the United States will again raise the issue of the deployment of binary chemical weapons in Western Europe, and this time it intends to gain the consent of the allies, especially the FRG. This is being done despite the protests of large segments of the public in these countries. A vehement protest was voiced by Chairman E. Barr of the West German Bundestag commission on disarmament and arms control when he declared that the approval of the American plans would lead to a new round of the chemical arms race and would sabotage the Geneva talks on the prohibition of chemical weapons.

During congressional hearings in May-June 1985, the opponents of binary weapons cited detailed counterarguments with regard to virtually all aspects of the "binary program." In particular, they questioned the administration's statement about the "absolute" safety of the new weapons for military personnel and the population during their storage and shipment: One of their components is the toxic chemical "DF," which caused the death and suffering of thousands of people during a chemical leak resulting from an accident in a plant of the American Union Carbide concern in Bhopal.

In 1985 the administration launched another concerted attack on the opponents of binary weapons to splinter the opposition and push the allocations requested by the Pentagon through Congress. The Pentagon requested 1.3 billion dollars for all chemical arms programs in fiscal year 1986, including 174.5 million dollars for the "binary program" (152.8 million for the completion of the construction of the facility for the production of the Big Eye chemical bomb and its purchase; 21.7 million for the production of the 155-mm artillery shell in a binary charge). The military establishment demanded another 20.4 million dollars for the research and development of multibarreled jet-propelled mounts for binary weapons.

The White House, the CIA and the Pentagon pressured congressmen and senators. The campaign was joined by senators J. Glenn, B. Goldwater, Jr., S. Nunn and J. Warner, who support the administration's policy on binary weapons.

As a result, when the military budget for 1986 was being discussed, a congressional conference committee recommended the allocation of 155 million dollars for the production of binary weapons under strong pressure from the administration. Several stipulations were made on the initiative of Congressman I. Skelton, however, making the beginning of the production of these weapons in September 1987 conditional upon the consent of the NATO allies to deploy binary weapons on their territory, the resolution of problems in their storage and shipment and the completion of the tests of the Big Eye chemical bomb. This paved the way for the implementation of the decision announced by President Reagan in February 1982 on the extensive "chemical rearming" of the U.S. Armed Forces.

The U.S. position on the prohibition of chemical weapons and the Reagan Administration's efforts to intensify the "chemical rearmament" program prove

that Washington is still not ready to make major realistic decisions in this sphere. And this is contrary to the agreement the leaders of the USSR and United States reached in November 1985 at their meeting in Geneva on the promotion of more active efforts to conclude an effective and verifiable international convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons and the destruction of chemical stockpiles.

The latest round of the multilateral talks on the prohibition of chemical weapons within the framework of the Geneva Conference on Disarmament in January-April 1986 indicated that the U.S. line here has not undergone any kind of constructive changes either. The American delegation adhered to its position of April 1984, impeding the search for mutually acceptable solutions to the main negotiating points, especially the issue of verification. This was also confirmed by the Soviet-American bilateral consultations in late January and early February on the prohibition of chemical weapons.

In contrast to the unconstructive policy of the United States on the prohibition of chemical weapons, the Soviet Union's approach is innovative and businesslike.

In April 1986 the USSR delegation at the Geneva Conference on Disarmament submitted far-reaching compromise proposals for discussion in amplification of the corresponding sections of M. S. Gorbachev's statement of 15 January 1986. They concern the dates for the announcement of the locations of chemical weapons production facilities, the cessation of their functioning and the commencement of their destruction or dismantling, as well as the means of the strict verification of all these measures. These initiatives hold out the real possibility of the conclusion of an international convention prohibiting chemical weapons without delay. The interests of these talks, the next round of which will be held in June, demand an appropriate response from our Western partners, especially the United States, to the extremely precise Soviet proposals, without any kind of diplomatic trickery or insincere reasoning. This kind of approach would certainly contribute to the conclusion of an international convention on the prohibition and elimination of chemical arms.

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RAID ON LIBYA VIEWED IN CONTEXT OF 'REAGAN DOCTRINE'

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 6, Jun 86 (signed to press 23 May 86) pp 63-67

[Article by N. D. Turkatenko (Washington): "Militaristic Fever in Washington"]

[Text] Militaristic fever has been a common phenomenon in Washington corridors of power for a long time. Some local and foreign correspondents no longer take any notice of it, and the fever-stricken inhabitants of these corridors appear to have simply forgotten how a normal state of health feels. In the last 2 or 3 months, however, there was such a dangerous outbreak of this fever that it aroused keen interest once again in virtually all parts of the world. The culminating point was the attack on Libya, a country located thousands of kilometers away from the borders of the United States, by the planes of the American Sixth Fleet and the FB-111 bombers based in Great Britain.

Let us briefly recall some of the circumstances of the attack and related events in the American capital. This will help to "illustrate" the motives, causes and consequences of some major aspects of Washington's current policy line in world affairs, presented to the public here as a "new era" in U.S. diplomacy.

The startling news that "something is going on" in Libya was reported on the ABC and CNN television networks. Around seven in the evening Washington time, on Monday, 14 April, their correspondents in Tripoli contacted their headquarters and reported that all hell had broken loose somewhere around the Libyan capital. The correspondents, who were still half asleep--they had been awakened by explosions at two in the morning local time--had to immediately begin reporting live. They said that powerful explosions and artillery fire could be heard somewhere near the hotel from which the broadcast was coming. All of the lights in the city had gone out. Only the flashes of explosions were visible in the dark sky.

Explanations did not take long to arrive. The White House announced a special briefing by White House Deputy Press Secretary L. Speakes. In a smooth voice, he told the journalists who rushed into the pressroom that the United States, "acting in self-defense," had delivered a strike at "command centers, airports and training camps" around Tripoli and Benghazi. This was followed by an address to the nation by President Reagan on national television and by a

joint press conference with Secretary of State G. Shultz and Secretary of Defense C. Weinberger, which was also televised. "We have done what we had to do, and, if necessary, we shall do it again," the President declared.

In this way, a powerful propaganda campaign was launched to convince the Americans that the administration had made a "bold and risky but absolutely necessary decision." In briefings in the White House, State Department and Pentagon and in speeches and statements by the Presidents and the heads of these departments, concerning various topics but always including the "Libyan motif," the Americans were smothered by an avalanche of cleverly shuffled facts, wordy commentaries and the most diverse speculations about the situation in Libya and the administration's future intentions. Of course, world public opinion was another important target.

The propaganda assault was intended to portray the criminal armed attack on another country as the United States' exercise of the "right of self-defense," and, what is more, "in accordance with the UN charter." It was asserted that Libya was the "seat of international terrorism" and that Libya "had a hand" in all terrorist acts against the United States and other Western countries and their citizens.

The bomb set off in a West Berlin disco at the beginning of April, resulting in the death of two people, including an American soldier, was cited as a "specific" example, serving as the immediate pretext for the attack on Libya. Several announcements were made on the highest level in Washington that the United States had "irrefutable proof" that the bomb had been set off on M. Qadhafi's orders.

The U.S. administration emphasized that "Operation El Dorado Canyon" (this is what the Pentagon named the raid on Libya) was undertaken exclusively "for the purpose of self-defense" and to preclude possible future terrorist actions against American citizens. In this way, it tried to present the matter as if the attack on Libya were an extreme, "forced" measure, testifying only that the United States would resort to the use of military strength only when forced to do so by circumstances beyond its control.

But "Operation El Dorado Canyon" should be examined in a broader context, namely in the context of the current administration's clearly defined line in international affairs in general. This is the line of the notorious "doctrine of neoglobalism," representing the analytical and practical basis of the symbiosis of U.S. foreign and military policy. In Washington they prefer to call this the "Reagan Doctrine" because its basic premises and aims were set forth precisely in his public statements and his reports to the Congress.

An analysis of these premises and of commentaries in the local press indicates that "Operation El Dorado Canyon" is a link in a single and lengthy chain of actions committed or planned by the Reagan Administration along the perimeter of the entire planet--from Nicaragua to Libya, Afghanistan, Cambodia and Angola. The invasion of Grenada by U.S. armed forces in 1983 was a link in the chain. Another link was the set of maneuvers by the American Sixth Fleet, with three atomic aircraft carriers, in March 1986 in the Mediterranean, in

direct proximity to the Libyan coast, maneuvers undertaken for the purpose of exerting pressure on Libya and forcing it to make foreign policy changes in accordance with Washington's wishes. At first it was announced that the purpose of these maneuvers was to reaffirm the U.S. right of free navigation. Then the ships of the Sixth Fleet and carrier-based planes fired on Libyan patrol boats, sinking two of them, on the pretext that they "approached the American ships in a threatening manner." At the same time, a supposedly retaliatory missile strike was delivered against military targets on Libyan territory. Now it is completely obvious that the March maneuvers by the Sixth Fleet near the Libyan coast were nothing other than an exercise in preparation for "Operation El Dorado Canyon," and that the latter was a rehearsal for new actions of this kind against Libya and against other countries with policies unacceptable to Washington.

Above all, in the opinion of people here, the direct use of American armed forces against Nicaragua is being planned. According to some sources cited in the BALTIMORE SUN, the administration intends "at this time" to repeat "Operation El Dorado Canyon" in Nicaragua--that is, it intends to make Nicaragua the target of the same kind of bomb and missile strike as it delivered in Libya. Other far-reaching goals, however, have also been set. People in Washington expect the delivery of strikes at Nicaragua--especially if the request for 100 million dollars in direct military allocations for the "Contras" can be "pushed" through Congress--to facilitate the successful invasion of this country by Somozist gangs and the overthrow of the Sandinist government.

The administration has also decided to increase overt military assistance to the Afghan Dushmans and the cutthroats from the UNITA gang, providing them not only with large sums of money but also with the latest weapons, such as the Stinger portable antiaircraft missiles.

For a clearer view of all these operations, we will return to the essence of the "Reagan Doctrine" and recall the circumstances of its birth, its purpose and the means by which the administration hopes to implement it.*

In the opinion of the well-known correspondent C. Krauthammer, a regular contributor to TIME magazine, the "Reagan Doctrine" took shape just recently, in late 1984 and early 1985, and its basic premises were set forth in the President's 1985 State of the Union address. In general, Krauthammer approves of the doctrine, but in his praise of it, he unwittingly divulges all of its details.

In an essay entitled "The Reagan Doctrine" in the 1 April 1985 of TIME, Krauthammer states that it is a continuation of the doctrines of Truman, Nixon and Carter. The "Truman Doctrine," the correspondent writes, set out the basic axiom of postwar U.S. foreign policy--the "containment of communism." In combination with President Kennedy's pledge to "pay any price and bear any burden to assure the success of liberty," the idea of "containment" reached its acme. The theory died shortly after the war in Vietnam. It was followed by the "Nixon Doctrine," announcing reliance on "friendly regimes." It also collapsed, however, because the "jewel in the crown" of these regimes was the shah's Iran. Next came the "Carter Doctrine," with its emphasis on unilateral

* See N. S. Beglova and V. A. Kremenjuk, "The 'Reagan Doctrine'--The Policy of Escalated Intervention," SSHA: EPI, 1985, No 11--Ed.

U.S. action in defense of the interests of the "entire West" and with its "rapid deployment force," which has never been deployed properly anywhere. The "Reagan Doctrine" included all of these premises, the article stresses. This doctrine, however, placed much stronger emphasis on the direct use of American military strength against all countries and people fighting for national independence and against the imperialist export of counterrevolution.

Even the essayist admits that the "Reagan Doctrine" is a doctrine of "containing" and of "rolling back" communism, with the aid of..."revolution"! Yes, yes, "revolution," because the doctrine "supports not the status quo but revolution." Here they are, Washington's attempts to pass counterrevolutionaries off as revolutionaries.

Incidentally, Krauthammer stresses that this is, regrettably, not an easy matter.

How can the Washington administration's denunciation of the Salvadoran rebels be reconciled with its simultaneous praise of the "rebel operations" of the Nicaraguan "Contras"? The journalist admits that the authors of the "Reagan Doctrine" are stretching the point when they call the U.S. support of "democratic rebels" or "freedom fighters" an act of "self-defense" and something "sanctioned by international law." In fact, the "Reagan Doctrine" essentially, in Krauthammer's opinion, refutes the "excessive concern" of other countries for national sovereignty.

As the saying goes, no one could put it better....

Tracing the development of the "Reagan Doctrine," the same author reveals a new element, intended to secure widespread support for the doctrine within the United States and even abroad. He describes this element as "reliance on a third force." Krauthammer's thoughts on this topic, in another essay in the 10 March 1986 issue of TIME magazine, are the following. After calling the "struggle for freedom" the basic foreign policy aim, the "Reagan Doctrine" was in an extremely vulnerable position from the standpoint of American public opinion because it ignored the issue of U.S. relations with friendly dictatorships. The administration adhered to an old principle: "This dictator is a son of a bitch, but he is our son of a bitch." The solution to this problem, in Krauthammer's opinion, was simple: "reliance on a third force" in countries where "communist rebels" are fighting against rightist dictatorships. The author cites the new government of Corazon Aquino in the Philippines and the overthrow of Haitian dictator Duvalier as examples of the success of this line.

It is true that Washington became involved in the "evacuation" of former President F. Marcos from the Philippines and "Baby Doc" from Haiti by offering them and their entourage the use of American Air Force planes and by lavishing them with truly touching concern, so that they could live out their lives in peace and luxury. But the events in the Philippines and Haiti developed not as a result of the support of "third forces" there by the United States, but against U.S. wishes. Nevertheless, people in Washington have taken all the credit and are calling the United States "the pillar and bastion of true democracy." The author advises the administration to continue developing this

postulate with a view to the situation in other countries, such as Chile, where Pinochet, the Americans' latest "son of a bitch," could be unseated by the force of public outrage.

Therefore, there are new tactical elements in the foreign policy of the current administration, although they could hardly be called new in the full sense of the term. After the attacks on the Libyan patrol boats during the Sixth Fleet's maneuvers in the Mediterranean, U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT declared: "By issuing the order to commit American armed forces to action in two of the planet's hot spots (this attack and the transfer of Honduran troops to the Nicaraguan border on American military helicopters--N. T.), Ronald Reagan sent a signal to friends and enemies: Washington is no longer paralyzed by the memory of Vietnam and is prepared to use military force when its interests are threatened.... Everyone has now been informed of the new meaning of Reagan's tough speeches and the extensive buildup of military strength during his presidency."

As the criminal aggressive action against Libya and subsequent events indicated, not to mention the unconcealed threats to order American armed forces into action again "if necessary," people in Washington have no intention of listening to the demands of the world public and the leaders of many states. Seized by gambling fever, top administration officials have obviously decided to stake their all, in spite of the mounting anxiety in the United States itself. This anxiety has been reflected in the attempts of Democratic members of the Congress and even many Republican members to force the administration to observe at least American laws if not the standards of international law. Congressmen are complaining that the President did not consult them before ordering the attack on Libya; in their opinion, he should have done this in accordance with the War Powers Act of 1973, a law passed to avoid the repetition of an armed attack on another country without the knowledge of Congress, as in the case of Vietnam.

Pointing out the militaristic fever that has seized Washington, the BALTIMORE SUN described the current situation as the following. Many legal and diplomatic experts are disturbed by the fact that the Reagan Administration demonstrated its willingness to act unilaterally, departing completely from the standards of international law. Under the Reagan Administration the United States has ceased to pay attention to the World Court in The Hague (this is a reference to the U.S. refusal to submit to its jurisdiction during the discussion of Nicaragua's protest against the mining of Nicaraguan ports by CIA agents--N. T.); it has refused to sign the international UN convention on the law of the sea, approved by more than 150 countries; it has given a onesided interpretation to the Soviet-American 1972 ABM treaty for the purpose of starting work on Reagan's "Star Wars" program; it has departed from the position of previous administrations, which recognized the illegality of Israel's occupation of the West Bank of the Jordan; it has refused to ratify the two supplementary protocols of 1977 to the 1949 Geneva conventions on the protection of war victims; it withdrew from UNESCO, and so forth.

BUSINESS WEEK correspondent J. Pierson clarifies the matter: "Reagan wanted to be the first president to accomplish what Secretary of State John Foster

Dulles announced but was unable to do in the 1950's: to roll back communism throughout the world."

Now what? This question is being asked with increasing anxiety in the United States. A partial answer was provided by famous historian A. Schlesinger in a WALL STREET JOURNAL article on 18 April 1986. The administration, he wrote, has almost completely forgotten the lessons of the intervention which ended in total failure for the United States. For example, the events which took place in the Bay of Pigs in April 1961 are now being repeated in slow motion. Once again, the CIA "has put together emigre armed forces, this time to be used against Nicaragua.... Just as it did a quarter of a century ago, Washington relied on a motley group of former Somozists, whose future depends completely on service to the CIA.... If the Contras cannot overthrow the Sandinistas, arguments will be cited, just as they were 25 years ago, ...in favor of sending U.S. armed forces to Central America to do what the Contras could not do."

Pointing out the extremely dangerous implications of the "Reagan Doctrine" for the entire world and for the United States itself, the historian wrote: "Did Reagan and company ever ask themselves one simple question: What then? What will happen if American support and CIA subsidies are not enough to put the 'freedom fighters' in power? Then the Reagan Doctrine will unavoidably end in empty threats or a crusade. If the result is a crusade in the Rambo spirit (this is a popular American movie about the bloody adventures of the "fearless and omnipotent" Rambo, who goes to Vietnam and defeats "whole hordes of Vietnamese and Russians"--N. T.), what will become of the United States? Will the American people accept the commitment of soldiers to action in costly wars in the Third World that do not affect American interests directly?"

The Bay of Pigs should be a warning, and not an example, for the United States, Schlesinger stressed. If the administration goes too far in implementing the "Reagan Doctrine," it will involve the United States in chronic wars abroad, mounting expenses and the militarization of all American life. The historian also warned that this kind of policy could actually establish a presidential dictatorship in the United States.

Not all of the questions connected with the "Reagan Doctrine" are answered in A. Schlesinger's article. For example, it does not say enough about the world reaction to the militaristic fever in Washington, the increasing opposition to this policy line in many countries, including the United States, and the thousands of demonstrators who protested the attack on Libya. The issues it does examine, however, should force the Rambos in Washington to think long and hard about what they are doing.

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CSO: 1803/09

WEST GERMAN BOOK CRITICIZING SDI REVIEWED

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 6, Jun 86 (signed to press 23 May 86) pp 101-102

[Review by V. I. Kashechko of book "Die Front im All. Weltraumruestung und atomarer Erstschlag" by D. Engels, J. Scheffran and E. Sieker, Koeln, Phal-Rugenstein, 1984, 254 pages]

[Text] The book "Die Front im All" [Front in the Universe] is a collective study by three West German authors: Dieter Engels, an astronomer from Bonn University and a government adviser on disarmament in North Rhein-Westphalia; Jurgen Scheffran, member of the "Scientists Against the Militarization of Space" Goettingen Congress preparatory group; and Ekkerhard Sieker, member of the "Mainzer-23" group and member of the board of Scientists for Peace and Disarmament. The authors resolutely object to the plans for an arms race in space and pointedly criticize the "Strategic Defense Initiative" in this context. The SDI will not only disrupt the strategic balance between the USSR and United States, they write, but will also have far-reaching consequences undermining the security of Europe and all countries in the world. The authors believe that the "Star Wars" program is a sign of the same kind of militarist thinking that gave birth to the "air-land battle" concept, the "Rogers plan" and many other American strategic theories.

The authors focus attention on the fact that even the political groups in Western Europe which support many U.S. military policy aims are expressing serious concern about the potential impact of the SDI on relations within NATO. This concern was particularly apparent in an interview with FRG Defense Minister Woerner in SUDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG: "We must keep the SDI," he said, "from destabilizing the balance between East and West and aiding in the separation of Western Europe from the United States and, possibly, a rift in the Western alliance" (p 16).

The plans for the militarization of space can only be impeded, the authors of the book believe, by joint resolute actions by members of the antiwar movement in Europe and the United States. This movement has already become a significant political factor, the book says. The issues of international security, keeping the peace and disarmament have become the most vital issues of the present day for the broadest segments of the population (p 19). Detailed information about the danger of "Star Wars" must, the authors write, reach

every member of the antiwar movement and, what is more, each inhabitant of the planet. At this time, the authors of the collective work assert, the danger of the SDI is recognized and therefore repudiated by primarily the most informed population strata--that is, members of the academic community, former members of the military and some politicians (p 19).

The deployment of the American intermediate-range missiles in Europe and the plans to implement the SDI signify that people in Washington expect to make Europe a stage of combat, the authors warn. They advise West European governments to refuse to cooperate in the implementation of the SDI.

The authors thoroughly analyze the history of the Pentagon's penetration of space and state that the foundations of the "space shield" were laid back in the years of the Carter presidency. It was then that American physicist Stephen Bardwell was working on the theory of the use of lasers in space. Edward Teller proposed the x-ray laser project. General Daniel O. Graham stressed in the book "High Frontier" the "historic significance of the universe as the fourth dimension of combat operations" and suggested the creation of a tiered BMD system with space-based elements. Senator Wallop had already been actively promoting the establishment of space combat stations for several years, the authors write. The first military satellite, the "Discoverer 1," was launched back in 1958, and now two-thirds of all American space objects are used for military purposes. Intelligence data is collected by 55 percent of all U.S. military satellites. The special space command, SPACECOM, located on Peterson Air Force Base in Colorado Springs, has been in operation since 1 September 1982, the authors recall.

The authors describe various types of antisatellite and antimissile weapons: killer satellites, homing missiles with nuclear and conventional warheads, lasers (chemical and x-ray), neutron, proton, particle beam and kinetic weapons, electromagnetic guns, non-nuclear homing missiles launched from the F-15 fighter (this system was tested in 1984 and 1985), electronic means of neutralizing enemy satellites and antimissiles in which a spherical net is unfurled just before the collision with the enemy missile and then destroys both missiles (this system was tested in 1984). Nevertheless, the majority of informed American experts are convinced of the impossibility of creating an absolutely impenetrable ABM system. This is obviously a utopian idea because the other side will certainly take countermeasures, the book says (p 70).

The authors insist on the strict observance of the 1972 treaty on the limitation of ABM systems. Its conclusion reflected awareness of the fact that effective defense against nuclear weapons is technologically impracticable, and that the intention to create this kind of defense system leads to military and political destabilization (p 84). In view of this, the expediency of the SDI plans is questionable. The authors agree with prominent FRG politician E. Barr's statement that security can be safeguarded not by the introduction of new systems, but by the elimination of existing ones (p 93).

More and more people in the Federal Republic of Germany realize that Europe will gain nothing from the plans for the militarization of space but weaker security. The book by the West German scientists testifies that serious opposition to the plans for the militarization of space is mounting in the NATO countries allied with the United States.

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BOOK ON U.S.-BRITISH COOPERATION IN NUCLEAR ARMS

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 6, Jun 86 (signed to press 23 May 86) pp 105-107

[Review by V. F. Davydov of book "The British Nuclear Deterrent" by Peter Malone, London and Sydney, Groom Helm, New York, St. Martin's Press, 1984, 200 pages]

[Text] England's policy and its interrelations with the United States in the sphere of strategic nuclear arms are analyzed in this book. Its author, American political scientist P. Malone, worked for many years at Harvard University and the RAND Corporation.

In this book he offers conclusive evidence that Great Britain's nuclear arsenal is closely integrated with the American one and is an integral part of the North Atlantic alliance's "deterrent."

By the terms of an Anglo-American agreement concluded in 1958 on cooperation in the use of atomic energy for mutual defense, England acquired access to the American information, technology and materials needed by its nuclear forces. London not only acquired the chance to purchase American means of delivering nuclear weapons, the Polaris missiles, but also to conduct tests on the American testing ground in Nevada. Malone stresses that "cooperation was intimate and mutual in the late 1950's and early 1960's." The results of American atomic research in the laboratories in Los Angeles and Livermore were actively used by the English laboratory in Aldermaston. The scales of U.S. and English research, however, are not comparable: By 1979 the United States had conducted 870 nuclear tests, while England had conducted 30, and allocations for American laboratories were five times as great as those for English laboratories. London "pays" for the access to American nuclear information by purchasing nuclear delivery means from the United States. In 1973 England began modernizing the Polaris missile, and in 1980 it decided to buy Trident missile systems from the United States.

England is actively working with the United States in the production and exchange of fissionable materials for the production of nuclear devices. In the 1950's and 1960's the United States supplied England with highly concentrated uranium in exchange for plutonium. Malone feels that London gave Washington direct assistance between 1958 and 1964, when the United States deployed 7,000 tactical nuclear weapons in Europe: "It is quite possible that

England built some of these weapons and then transferred them to America for deployment in Europe" (p 61). But most of the traffic in nuclear materials--highly concentrated uranium for nuclear submarines, tritium for nuclear devices and zirconium for reactors--was from the United States to England.

The Reagan Administration's plans to modernize the U.S. nuclear forces envisage a dramatic rise in the demand for fissionable materials, which could reduce shipments to England. London has taken preventive measures against this possibility by becoming more self-sufficient in nuclear materials--it enlarged facilities for the production of concentrated uranium and plutonium and began the production of tritium. "England's dependence on American materials is expected to decrease," Malone writes, "although the United States agreed in 1980 to continue deliveries of uranium for atomic submarines and weapons and England, in turn, agreed to supply the United States with plutonium and other nuclear materials" (p 63).

Malone states that "England has retained the national control, management and command of its strategic forces, consisting of Polaris missiles, but its facilities for the surveillance of Soviet submarine systems are closely integrated with American ones." Furthermore, the author stresses, England is totally dependent on the United States in the space and air surveillance of Soviet forces (p 69).

The close coordination of U.S. and English intelligence services with regard to USSR defensive operations has been practiced throughout the postwar period. The two countries have exchanged air reconnaissance data since 1947. American U-2 spy planes began taking off from Great Britain for reconnaissance flights in 1955. American satellite tracking stations and nuclear forces communication and control centers are also located in England. But the Americans are not in debt to the English. "The United States regularly transmits top secret strategic information to England" (p 72). As a result, English nuclear forces are closely integrated with American ones in the sphere of strategic planning as well. The existence of a common list of targets and the division of the duties and functions of nuclear forces presuppose England's compliance with U.S. plans for its nuclear forces in the future.

Malone stresses that, in spite of the sharp decline in England's political role and of Washington's desire to completely centralize the control of strategic forces, the United States is willing to help England keep its strategic missiles aimed at the Soviet Union (p 75). The reason, he writes, is that, in the 1980's, not one of the American allies--not Japan, the FRG or France--is willing or able to take on the functions of the United States' "chief assistant" (p 76). In the military and political respects, England is still the United States' closest and most influential NATO ally and its main partner in the promotion of American strategy in Europe. Of course, considering the comparative positions of the United States and England in today's world, there is no point in wondering which will benefit more from the continuation of the nuclear cooperation, but it is obvious that Washington is also deriving substantial benefits from it. "The United States has privately acknowledged that the independent nuclear forces of England are extremely valuable and useful in the presence of strategic parity between the United States and the USSR," Malone concludes (p 78).

The author feels that the inclusion of the nuclear forces of England and France in the overall nuclear balance between East and West is logical and natural because they serve the same strategic goals as the American intermediate-range missiles. But this is precisely why, in his opinion, the U.S. refusal to take the nuclear forces of England and France into account in nuclear arms limitation talks is also understandable. At the same time, P. Malone supports the retention of the English nuclear forces and their continued modernization with U.S. assistance.

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BOVIN'S ANSWERS TO FOREIGN AUDIENCES' QUESTIONS IN BOOK FORM

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 6, Jun 86 (signed to press 23 May 86) pp 112-114

[Review by A. V. Vakhrameyev of book "Pogovorim po sushchestvu.... O mire i voyne, razryadke i konfrontatsii, razoruzhenii i gonke vooruzhenii i o drugikh problemakh mirovoy politiki" [Let Us Talk About the Main Things.... About Peace and War, Detente and Confrontation, Disarmament and the Arms Race and About Other Problems in World Politics] by Aleksandr Bovin, Moscow, Mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya, 1985, 101 pages]

[Text] The author probably does not need any introduction. His talents as a thorough analyst and brilliant journalist are clearly displayed in this book. The genre is unusual. It is an attempt to summarize the author's replies to the most typical questions he was asked when he spoke to foreign audiences. As a rule, the questions are pointed, and sometimes even hostile. But as A. Ye. Bovin correctly notes, "there are no bad questions, there are only bad answers" (p 3). We must immediately say that we do not think there are any bad answers in this book. They are convincing and logical. We would like to discuss some of them, pertaining to the issues of war and peace and Soviet-American relations, in detail.

It is no coincidence that the first questions are "Will there be a war? Is World War III, a global East-West confrontation, approaching?" It would be difficult to find an unequivocal answer. The author does not even try to find one, replying that "the realities by which we are surrounded and in which we are immersed include the possibility of world war and the possibility of preventing this kind of war" (p 5). The aggressive nature of present-day imperialism, the militarization of the economy, politics and spiritual life of today's bourgeois society, the organic hostility of its extremist, belligerent segments toward the very existence of the socialist world, which they regard as a "historical error" that must be corrected, and the escalation of the arms race and military preparations in the capitalist world--this is a far from complete list of the factors making a thermonuclear world war a possibility. But there are also factors capable of preventing this kind of war, excluding it from the life of society and establishing the objective conditions necessary to keep, as the resolutions of the 27th CPSU Congress say, the confrontation between capitalism and socialism solely and exclusively in the forms of peaceful coexistence and peaceful competition. These factors

are primarily connected with the balance of power in today's world. In connection with this, the author notes that "it was precisely in the 20th century that forces and circumstances capable of preventing a new world holocaust came into being for the first time in history. The socialist countries, the non-aligned states and the public antiwar and antinuclear movements have all put strict limits on the sociopolitical areas where militarism still prevails" (p 6).

Another dimension, military-technical rather than sociopolitical, is also important. "For the first time in history, people have created a weapon of such destructive force and have accumulated it in such huge quantities that the future of the human race is in question.... Each of the potential adversaries faces the danger of being not simply defeated, but also annihilated in a future war.... The first to start it will be the second to die" (pp 6-7). These new realities of the nuclear-space age demand the reassessment of several traditional and conventional beliefs of the pre-nuclear era, particularly K. Clausewitz' well-known statement that "war is a continuation of policy by other means." Of course, any war has always been and will always be a continuation of a specific policy. As the author correctly notes, however, Clausewitz' statement has another meaning--a suggested one in addition to the declarative one. It offers the statesman a choice: He can choose either peaceful or violent means, depending on the specific set of circumstances. "It is here that Clausewitz has become obsolete. Because there is not, and cannot be, a political goal (unless, of course, the goal is national suicide) warranting the start of a nuclear war. There is not and there cannot be a goal worth putting the existence of the human race in jeopardy" (p 8).

For the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries, whose love of peace stems from the nature of their social order, it has never been acceptable to attain goals or settle disputes with countries of a different social system with the aid of war or the use of force. As far as the countries of the capitalist world are concerned, especially the United States, the matter is much more complex. In spite of their nature, they must consider the realities of the nuclear age.

A. Ye. Bovin's book was written before the Geneva summit meeting and we would like to direct attention to his belief that detente is a complex matter. "If it is approached seriously, power politics must be renounced, the world must be accepted as it is, and efforts must be made to adapt to this world and to learn to coexist even with states for which there is no affection" (p 20). This is the test of detente the American administration failed in the late 1970's and, judging by all indications, would fail again today. This is attested to by the position U.S. ruling circles have taken on the USSR's proposals on the elimination of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction by the end of the 20th century, and by the continuation of underground nuclear tests in spite of the Soviet Union's repeated appeals to join it in their suspension.

Nevertheless, in addition to the contradictions and differences between the USSR and the United States, there is also a field of common and related interests. "Nuclear war would be a catastrophe," the book says, "for the

USSR and for the United States. This must be the point of departure. Agreements can then be reached" (p 96). But agreements must be negotiated on an equal basis--that is, with the acknowledgement and consideration of the legitimate interests of the USSR and United States as great powers, as states on whose interrelations the future of civilization and the cause of peace on our planet depend to a decisive degree.

It is precisely this kind of agreement that A. Ye. Bovin's book advocates. It is an excellent example of the art of polemics.

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CSO: 1803/09

FORM, FUNCTIONS OF PRESIDENTIAL ADVISORY COMMISSIONS DETAILED

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 6, Jun 86 (signed to press 23 May 86) pp 117-123

[Article by Yu. K. Abramov and V. M. Zubok: "Presidential Advisory Commissions"]

[Text] The tragic events of 28 January 1986 on Cape Canaveral gave rise to many questions--about the reasons for the loss of the "Challenger" and its crew, about the possibility of changes in the space research program and about the reliability of American space technology in general. The public concern about the Reagan Administration's plans to develop new technology in line with the "Strategic Defense Initiative" gave these events a political nature. The White House had to calm the public by creating a body for the "absolutely unbiased" investigation of the causes, preconditions and consequences of the disaster. As usual, a special presidential commission was formed. Former U.S. Secretary of State W. Rogers was appointed the head of the commission.

What kind of bodies are the presidential advisory commissions and what role do they play in the public administration network?

The presidential advisory commissions are an important part of the U.S. chief executive's ramified staff of advisors, which also includes the White House Staff, the National Security Council, the Council of Economic Advisers, several other temporary and permanent official bodies and many establishments and individuals making up the unofficial advisory network.¹ There is no question that the presidential advisory commissions have less influence than government agencies on day-to-day public administration, but they perform a variety of functions in the government and, as an instrument of political control, have several indisputable advantages over the permanent bodies serving the President. The activities of the commissions clearly confirm the tendency toward "the transfer of the main areas of decisionmaking to official or unofficial bodies under the direct jurisdiction of the head of state or government."²

The first mention of temporary presidential advisory bodies dates back to G. Washington's day.³ It was not until the beginning of this century, however, that the presidential advisory commissions became a common element of the central staff of the executive branch, reflecting the presidency's need for new, more flexible and more subtle instruments of response to the rapid changes in all spheres of public life and politics.

The "founding fathers" of the system of advisory commissions in the executive branch are usually considered to be T. Roosevelt and W. Wilson, who used them extensively as instruments of political control; prior to this the creation of commissions to investigate various governmental matters was essentially a congressional prerogative. The appearance of the presidential commissions was a sign of the intensification of the crisis of bourgeois parliamentarianism and the increased authority of the White House at the beginning of the 20th century. The commissions gave executive initiatives the semblance of responses to "public concerns": It was no coincidence that the presidential commissions came into fashion during the years of the most severe economic crisis of 1929-1932 and the subsequent "New Deal" of President F. Roosevelt. These commissions served as a major element of the reorganization of the executive branch of government in line with the "New Deal," paved the way for the qualitative expansion of government regulating authority, helped the President surmount the resistance of his opponents and provided "objective" grounds for the increased authority of the White House.

The men who succeeded F. Roosevelt in the White House continued to make active use of commissions to solve various administrative problems, and the intensity of their use steadily increased until the middle of the 1970's. Whereas only 9 commissions were created during the Eisenhower Administration, 12 were created under J. Kennedy, 28 under L. Johnson, and 33 during just the first term of the Nixon Administration.⁴ The most famous in history were the commissions formed to investigate the reasons for the defeat in Pearl Harbor, chaired by O. Roberts (1941-1942), foreign aid, chaired by A. Harriman (1947), civil rights, chaired by C. Wilson (1947), national priorities, chaired by J. Reston (1960), and the circumstances of the assassination of President J. Kennedy, chaired by E. Warren (1963-1964), and the presidential advisory council on executive organization, chaired by R. Ash (1971).⁵

The creation of advisory commissions always had the closest relationship to sociopolitical conditions in the country and the most acute and difficult problems requiring presidential intervention. Many of the commissions of Johnson's and Nixon's time were a reaction to excessive tension in the country, marked by the intensification of social struggle and the rise of the new protest movements. During the Carter Administration, when the American society was experiencing the aftereffects of profound disillusionment with government institutions, commissions were formed at the suggestion of the President on the selection and improvement of personnel for various links of the government. During the Reagan Administration, when the rightwing forces of the dominant class launched an attack on liberal varieties of bourgeois reformism, the conservative President suggested the creation of several commissions to investigate the possibility of limiting the regulative functions of government, decentralizing public administration, lowering the cost of the civil service and enhancing the effectiveness of the state-monopolist economy.⁶ In all, around 150 advisory commissions of various types have served the U.S. chief executive in the postwar period.⁷

In the kaleidoscope of establishments performing advisory functions for the chief executive, the commissions stand out primarily because they are temporary bodies created on the personal initiative of the President to provide him with

an expert assessment of a specific issue. To allow the commission to perform this task, the President invests it with the right and authority to obtain necessary documents and information from government agencies, conduct investigations and inspection tours inside and outside the country and enlist the services of government agencies and research establishments.

At the President's discretion, the commission's activities can be public or confidential. In the first case, its activities are covered extensively by the mass media, and its members grant interviews on the progress of investigations and organize public hearings on various matters and conferences with concerned individuals; the final document is a report, sometimes consisting of tens of thousands of pages, containing all of the collected documents and facts. Its final section consists of conclusions and recommendations approved unanimously (if there are differences of opinion, the basic recommendations can be followed by the "dissenting opinion" of the minority). But when the commission's work is confidential, its report is not published and is handed over to the President along with all working materials. The commission's work can take from several months to a year, and sometimes even longer. Commission activities are financed with special presidential funds or, more frequently, the funds of concerned federal agencies. Commission members usually agree to work for free, receiving only reimbursement for travel expenses. This principle has been adhered to most consistently under Ronald Reagan: The members of all the commissions he has created have not been paid a salary. This testifies, in part, to an attempt to secure the necessary social screening process (under these conditions, only rich people or people recruited from "respectable" establishments and large corporations can be members of the commissions). There is the belief that the "enthusiasm" of commission members, their willingness to work for free and their personal interest in the implementation of their recommendations make their work more productive and less costly than the work of permanent government establishments.⁸

The chief executive's channels of influence on commission activities are so diverse, however, that many American researchers have written about the total control of them by the President. He sets forth (in a special executive directive) the goals of commission activities, defines the limits of their authority and the principles of their financing and their interrelations with government bodies and the mass media, appoints their members and chairmen and sets the deadlines for their work. He avoids, however, open intervention in their activities, not to mention the exertion of pressure on them. The White House benefits much more from the preservation of the aura of "independence" and "impartiality" around the commissions and underscores the competence of their expert appraisals and recommendations, striving in every way to reinforce this reputation in the public mind.

The composition of the commissions warrants special discussion. As a rule, the members are people with many important contacts and experience in political administration, people who represent the establishment. The majority are former statesmen and politicians, representatives of giant corporations and the attorneys of government agencies and monopolies, and sometimes the heads of American labor unions (when G. Meany was the leader of the AFL-CIO, he was a member of the majority of commissions on the regulation of relations between

employers and unions). The commissions have also turned into something like a potential personnel reserve for the administration. For example, Secretary of State G. Shultz entered the Reagan Administration in 1982, but in 1981 he was already the chairman of a presidential advisory board on economic policy.

The technical aspect of the selection of personnel for the presidential commissions has been the responsibility of a special group on the presidential advisory staff since the 1960's. To this end, they use lists of former statesmen, speakers at national and international conferences and politically active businessmen, scientists and cultural figures; occasionally they enlist the services of recognized community leaders. The commissions range in size from 10-12 members, especially if they are investigating foreign and military policy issues, to a hundred or more, if they are investigating domestic political issues and should appear to be as representative as possible. The chairman is usually appointed by the President himself. On a list of postwar commission chairmen, we will find the names of A. Harriman, H. Lodge, W. Scranton, M. Eisenhower, J. Rockefeller III, W. Cohen, T. Gates and others. Ronald Reagan appointed H. Kissinger, B. Scowcroft, D. Packard and W. Rogers to this position. In addition to full-fledged members, the commissions also have a temporary personnel staff, frequently including young specialists from the capital's career bureaucracy.

There is the belief that the commission members and staffers are more willing than the employees of government institutions to solve problems and to examine them in the broader social context. The organizers of the commissions never miss an opportunity to stress that they gather all of the nation's "best minds" under one roof. However, as the American researcher writes, "these 'sensible' people support the social status quo and suggest ways of correcting its defects and reforming it, but do not make any demands for radical and qualitative changes."⁹

In the variety of instruments of political control under presidential jurisdiction, the commissions are distinguished by their broad range of specialties and abilities. They are usually set up by the President when there is a lack of unity and clarity in ruling circles with regard to key objectives or when there is a need for concerned groups, forces and parties to work out compromises; when there is a change of priorities in the aims and interests of the dominant class and a need to break stereotypes and surmount the inertia of certain groups; when the search for solutions demands the combined efforts of all the political forces of the dominant class, but the executive branch has an interest in creating the illusion of maximum public support for its actions. An important reason for the creation of advisory commissions is the President's need to neutralize the opposition in Congress (which also has the power to create commissions) and his reluctance to assume all of the responsibility for risky decisions.

The history of liberal reformism in the United States has witnessed examples of the successful use of commissions from the 1930's through the 1960's for the "public sanctioning" of the expansion of executive branch prerogatives in more and more new spheres, the reinforcement of economic regulation and the creation of federal social programs. The crisis of the Roosevelt type of

reformism in the 1970's, however, naturally affected the commissions. The commission set up by J. Carter in 1980 to set national priorities for the 1980's provides an example. In spite of the high qualifications of its members (more than a hundred renowned experts from various fields of knowledge, administration and culture, headed by H. Donovan, former president of the Time Corporation), its recommendations did not serve as the basis for subsequent policy. The commission advocated stronger government initiative in various socioeconomic spheres, and this was absolutely unacceptable to the conservatives who have been heading the government in Washington since 1981.

The current administration's reordering of policy priorities has affected the political significance and functions of the presidential commissions. They have become the leverage with which the President tries to gain the support of Washington bureaucrats and experts for the new priorities.

In addition to setting up commissions, Reagan is striving to win "public support" by accusing the "Washington bureaucrats" of inactivity and even of passive resistance. The President's creation of a commission of prominent representatives of the private sector in 1981 to monitor government spending was a politically smart move because it allowed Reagan to take the stance of a statesman attempting to rise above limited group interests for the sake of "national" interests and break down the departmental barriers objectively favoring "obsolete" liberal programs. The spacious confines of the commission allowed the chief executive to entrust the fate of civil service reform to big business. Its members were 163 top executives of the largest American corporations, headed by P. Grace. The recommendations of the Grace Commission were widely publicized by the President and became an important means of exerting pressure on the group of capital bureaucrats who continued to support the augmentation of social programs and economic regulation and impeded the pursuit of conservative policies.¹⁰

We have already mentioned that the commissions help the President in his struggle against rivals--in Congress and in his own and opposition parties. They give the chief executive a chance to take credit for the ideas and proposals of his opposition and critics. This was precisely the reason why the current administration created the presidential commission on defense management, because it was no secret that the Senate Committee on the Armed Services was preparing a thorough study of the need to reform the Pentagon and the entire system of military contracts.¹¹ The Reagan group has also made excellent use of the opposition's intellectual baggage in the sphere of foreign policy.

In particular, the White House founded a "bipartisan" commission on Central America and enlisted the services of major political forces in the commission's work.¹² Around 300 people worked with the commission, including government officials, opposition leaders, journalists, business and labor leaders, military experts, church officials, educators and economists; its report was based on information from hundreds of expert establishments and individual specialists. Former presidents R. Nixon, G. Ford and J. Carter, former secretaries of state, congressmen and chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff took part in the discussions.

By including the proposals of opposition leaders in their recommendations, the commissions essentially become a means of their "integration" into a coalition supporting the President's line. This was done, for example, by the Scowcroft Commission when a group of Democrats of the "new generation" in the House of Representatives, headed by L. Aspin, entered into negotiations with the White House--through B. Scowcroft's mediation--to work out a compromise in the sphere of strategic arms management.¹³

Ronald Reagan uses them quite often to "steal the thunder" of his critics. The creation of the commission by the President is notification that he is "aware of the problem" and has it under control, even though no steps have been taken to solve it. For example, when Ronald Reagan created a commission to investigate the competitive potential of American industry just before the 1984 campaign, he upset the advocates of immediate protectionist measures in foreign trade and, what is most important, protected himself from the possible criticism of Democrats. When the commission submitted its recommendations in January 1985 (after the election), they were unacceptable to the administration and were pigeonholed.¹⁴ Sometimes the recommendations of commissions, regardless of whether or not the President pays any attention to them, serve as the target of anticipated criticism, performing the function of a lightning-rod. The national space commission created in March 1985 is an example. It was supposed to "let off steam" in the fierce arguments over the President's "Strategic Defense Initiative."¹⁵ A lightning-rod is also useful in case of a major propaganda blunder. For example, when presidential counsellor E. Meese said that there were "no hungry people" in the United States and aroused a storm of indignation in the liberal press, Reagan quickly established a commission on food assistance (1983-1984).¹⁶

Under Ronald Reagan, the commissions have usually been created not in the expectation of future government intervention, but for the maximum postponement of this intervention, in the hope that "private initiative" and spontaneous processes will eventually take care of the problem. It is important for the administration to share the responsibility for this postponement as much as possible with other links of the political system, and the commissions are irreplaceable in these cases. The commission on social security reform provides an example of this. Its members included representatives of the Republican Party center (Senate Majority Leader R. Dole) and some prominent "liberal" Democrats (Senator D. Moynihan, Congressman C. Pepper and former Democratic administration official R. Ball); furthermore, the Democrats' proposals were used as the basis for compromise recommendations. As a result, the administration got what it wanted: The examination of the politically explosive issue of the radical reform of the social security system was postponed until the 1990's.¹⁷

The presidential commissions also play an important role in the complex process by which political groups are formed or dissolved in the upper echelon of political administration. Appointments to the commission give the President an additional opportunity to influence this process. On the one hand, he can appoint his own supporters to prestigious commissions, thereby helping them in the rapid elevation of their political status and the establishment of a broad variety of contacts. Commission members are often

representatives of influential groups of voters (labor unions, farmers' and women's organizations, etc.) whose support the President needs. It is indicative that great importance has been attached to the inclusion of big businessmen on the commissions under Ronald Reagan.

For President Reagan, the best candidate for commission chairman is an enterprising millionaire, a prominent manager who once worked in government and, what is most important, a person with conservative views on matters pertaining to the regulating role of government. One such person is W. Simon, formerly secretary of the treasury and now a member of the board of the giant American Citicorp, United Technologies and Xerox corporations, financial adviser to Arab sheikhs controlling capital investments in the southern United States and in Brazil, oil business mediator and chairman of the board of the huge philanthropic John Olin Foundation in New York. His personal annual income has been estimated at 2 million dollars.

Ronald Reagan also created a group to investigate initiative in the private sector for the purpose of publicizing its advantages, its "social responsibility" and the philanthropy of large corporations and prominent capitalists. He appointed W. Veriti, chairman of the board of Armco Steel, the head of the group.

The President's influence--through the commissions--on the process of personnel changes in political administration is also reflected in the fact that they help in building a "new establishment," without any break in the continuity of political administration, made up of people who support the President and his policies. Obviously, the leaders of the Reagan Administration had no intention of working with officials from previous administrations whom they associated with the "liberal establishment." For this reason, the appearance of these people on the commissions--especially those dealing with foreign and military policy--should not mislead anyone: For these old officials, appointments to Reagan's commissions represent an honorary intermediate phase in the process of their complete isolation from government.

"We need something for show," M. Deaver, Ronald Reagan's trusted adviser, frankly explained the reason for the creation of one commission. The history of the last 5 years testifies that White House leaders are making flexible use of the substantial and diverse political opportunities of the system of advisory commissions. The activities of the commissions appointed by Ronald Reagan have aided considerably in surmounting "liberal inertia" in the work and the thinking of government employees hired under previous administrations. The creation of these commissions has helped the President convince the public that he is a competent official who "sympathizes" with the needs of various social groups. With their assistance, Reagan has also been able to quite successfully seize the initiative from the Democrats, escape their criticism and create rifts in opposition ranks. In general, however, the potential of the commissions is naturally employed in a lopsided manner by the chief executive: Their main quality--the ability to give the President "impartial" expert advice on the most complex aspects of public administration--has been ignored.

FOOTNOTES

1. For more about the system of presidential advisory bodies, see V. N. Orlov, "The White House Advisory Staff," SSHA: EPI, 1977, No 7, pp 34-45; A. I. Filatov, "The U.S. National Security Council," *ibid.*, 1977, No 9, pp 114-122; I. V. Likhacheva, "Ekonomicheskaya nauka i ekonomicheskaya politika" [Economics and Economic Policy], Moscow, 1975; "The Presidential Advisory System," edited by T. Cronin and S. Greenberg, N.Y., 1969.
2. F. M. Burlatskiy and A. A. Galkin, "Sovremennyy Leviatan. Ocherki politicheskoy sotsiologii kapitalizma" [Modern-Day Leviathan. Essays on the Political Sociology of Capitalism], Moscow, 1985, p 88.
3. T. Wolanin, "Presidential Advisory Commissions. Truman to Nixon," Madison (Wis.), 1975, p 4.
4. *Ibid.*, p 124.
5. For a complete list of the presidential advisory commissions between 1945 and 1973, see T. Wolanin, *Op. cit.*, pp 205-215.
6. Some of the most important commissions created on Ronald Reagan's initiative are the advisory committee on national productivity, chaired by W. Simon (1981), the presidential advisory board on economic policy, chaired by G. Shultz (1981), the presidential advisory committee on federalism, chaired by P. Laxalt (1981), the task force on initiative in the private sector, chaired by W. Verity (1981-1982), the presidential commission on government spending controls, chaired by P. Grace (1982-1983), the national commission on social security reform, chaired by A. Greenspan (1982-1983), the presidential commission on strategic forces, chaired by B. Scowcroft (1983), the national bipartisan commission on Central America, chaired by H. Kissinger (1983-1984), the presidential commission on the competitive potential of American industry, chaired by J. Young (1983-1985), and the presidential commission on defense management, chaired by D. Packard (1985).
7. According to a Washington journal, in addition to the well-known presidential commissions, there are almost a thousand other commissions of various types, with around 21,000 members, under the jurisdiction of executive agencies (THE WASHINGTON MONTHLY, May 1983, p 41).
8. The average cost of the work of a commission is 800,000-900,000 dollars. In 1983 the total cost of commission operations for the year was estimated at 11 million dollars (THE NEW REPUBLIC, 29 August 1983, p 4).
9. T. Wolanin, *Op. cit.*, p 76.
10. FORTUNE, 16 May 1983, p 24.
11. Former Deputy Secretary of Defense D. Packard, chairman of the board of the large Hewlett-Packard company, a Pentagon contractor, was appointed

chairman of the commission. The commission members were E. Arbuckle, dean emeritus of the Stanford University School of Business; General R. Barrow, former Marine Corps commandant; Republican N. Brady, former senator and now chairman of the board of Dillon Reed and Co.; L. Cabot, chairman of the board of the Cabot Corporation; former Deputy Secretary of Defense F. Carlucci, now chairman of the board of Sears World Trade; W. Clark, one of the President's closest friends and consultant to the Rogers & Wells law firm; General P. Gorman, former commander of the U.S. Southern Command (Central and South America); K. Hills, former secretary of housing and urban development in the Ford Administration and now a partner in the Latham, Watkins & Hills law firm; W. Perry, former Pentagon official and now administrative director of Hambrecht and Quist; businessman C. Pilliod, associated with Goodyear Tire and Rubber; B. Scowcroft, President Ford's national security adviser and now research associate at the American Enterprise Institute and vice-chairman of Kissinger & Associates; H. Stein, chairman of President Nixon's Council of Economic Advisers and now researcher at the American Enterprise Institute; J. Woolsey, former Pentagon and NSC specialist and now assistant secretary of the Navy and adviser to the American representatives at the arms talks (THE WASHINGTON POST, 16 July 1985).

12. In addition to Kissinger, the commission consisted of former Governor of Texas W. Clements, Mayor of San Antonio (Texas) G. Cisneros, Yale University Professor K. Diaz-Alejandro, AFL-CIO head L. Kirkland, former Chairman of the Democratic Party National Committee R. Strauss, President J. Silber of Boston University, member of the U.S. Supreme Court P. Stewart, renowned political scientist R. Scammon and others ("The National Bipartisan Commission on Central America, 10 January 1984," Wash., 1984).
13. The members of the Scowcroft Commission were T. Reed--former special adviser to the President and secretary of the Air Force (vice-chairman of the commission), H. Brown--former secretary of defense and secretary of the Air Force, J. Deutsch--professor at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and former head of the Energy Research Office of the Energy Department, A. Haig--former secretary of state and supreme allied commander of the NATO armed forces in Europe, R. Helms--former director of the CIA, J. Lyons--deputy chairman of the AFL-CIO and chairman of its executive committee's subcommission on defense, L. Smith--vice admiral and former director of special Navy programs, M. Atkins--director of offensive and space systems in the Defense Department (executive secretary of the commission), and the abovementioned N. Brady, W. Clements and J. Woolsey (WEEKLY COMPILATION OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS, vol 19, No 6, 14 February 1983, p 196).
14. THE WASHINGTON POST, 16 June 1985.
15. The commission was headed by T. Payne, former director of NASA.
16. THE NATION, 24 December 1983, pp 651-652.
17. BUSINESS WEEK, 31 January 1983, pp 16-18.
18. FORTUNE, 20 September 1982, p 132.

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PLANNED IMPROVEMENT IN C³I SYSTEM FOR U.S., NATO DESCRIBED

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 6, Jun 86 (signed to press 23 May 86) pp 124-127

[Letter from reader V. M. Kalachev and response by A. I. Podberezkin and A. A. Chapis: "The Command & Control, Communication and Intelligence System"]

[Text] An extensive Pentagon and NATO program for the improvement of command & control, communication and intelligence is mentioned frequently in the press. Please explain the program in greater detail.

V. M. Kalachev, journalist and analyst of international affairs, Moscow.

The systems of command & control, communication and intelligence are conventionally termed C³I in American military literature.¹ The importance the United States attaches to these systems is attested to by the fact that they have been discussed repeatedly on the highest politico-military level, and their modernization has been declared not only an essential condition for the creation of the latest types and systems of weapons and military equipment, but also the main prerequisite for the attainment of American imperialism's foreign policy goals.

In the strategic program for the rearming of America, announced to the public by the White House on 2 October 1981, the development of a "fundamentally new, unified, comprehensive, global, reliable and invulnerable system of command & control, communication and intelligence" on the basis of the latest achievements in microelectronics and space technology was at the top of the list of the five guidelines for the modernization of strategic forces. This system, in the plans of Pentagon officials, should secure the reliable command and control of all U.S. nuclear forces--and, in the future, all U.S. conventional armed forces as well--throughout the world in a protracted nuclear war.²

This has been accompanied by an active process of the development of "completely unified policymaking within the confines of a single body," which will be responsible for the complete control of the development of NATO command & control, communication and intelligence systems.³ The establishment, within the near future, of a "completely integrated structure" of NATO command & control, communication and intelligence is the declared goal.

It is quite indicative that Washington is allocating huge sums for the development of these systems. Whereas expenditures on programs connected with C³I systems averaged 7 billion dollars a year in 1976-1980, they had already increased by 28 percent in 1981 and had reached 31.5 billion dollars by 1983. Allocations for these purposes increased just as quickly in subsequent years. In fiscal year 1985 all of these programs were estimated at 36 billion dollars, and the sum allocated for fiscal year 1986 was 40.6 billion, or around 13 percent of the entire American military budget.⁴ This surpasses any military program of the U.S. Department of Defense. For example, the total cost of the MX program (100 missiles) will be just over 20 billion dollars in 1989, and 30 billion dollars, according to estimates, will be spent on the B-1B strategic bomber (also 100) by 1989.⁵ In view of the fact that the significance of C³I systems will grow considerably, particularly in connection with the "Strategic Defense Initiative," we can assume that the tendency toward the increase (absolute and relative) in allocations for the command & control, communication and intelligence system will continue in the next few years and will even grow stronger.

The main guidelines in the C³I sphere are the improvement of space and earth communication systems, radar stations and early warning satellites, the establishment of new ground information processing centers, command points for the command and control of nuclear forces during a nuclear war (including airborne command points) and equipment for communication with strategic bombers and submarines and the modernization of existing ones.⁶ The group of measures includes programs for the establishment of qualitatively new means of air and space reconnaissance, navigation, geodesy and meteorology, observation posts and stations for the surveillance of all air and space developments.⁷ Thousands of transceiving points will be established, and systems for controlling and communicating with ICBM's, radioelectronic means of combat and airborne systems for the delivery of nuclear weapons to targets and guidance systems will be modernized.⁸

Even this simple and far from complete list of the main guidelines of C³I improvement proves that the United States intends to radically remodel the entire complex group of electronic equipment and computers now serving as the basis for the functioning of weapons, combat equipment and armed forces. This group will be turned into a unified and integrated system of military command & control, communication and intelligence--from the lowest links to the President--with the aid of which the U.S. military and political leadership can effectively control all elements of the nation's military machine throughout the world. It will cover literally the entire organization of the U.S. Armed Forces. For this reason, it is not surprising that the system is called the "brain" or "nervous system" of the nation's military potential.

The qualitative changes that are now being made in the U.S. systems of military command and control reflect some of the objective processes and distinctive features of the present phase of the military-technical revolution. The development of the latest systems and types of weapons and military equipment is now being accompanied by a sharp rise in the percentage of radioelectronic and optical electronic equipment and automated command and control systems with the extensive use of microelectronics.

Under the influence of these processes, the entire U.S. military machine is being virtually rebuilt and transferred to a qualitatively new level of combat effectiveness of all types and systems of weapons and military equipment.

The central objective of the Department of Defense was described in C. Weinberger's report to the Congress as "the creation of invulnerable, reliable and interactive C³I systems, which will maximize the effectiveness of the use of our armed forces and arms...and secure the means of controlling the escalation of a military conflict and contribute to the rapid conclusion of military operations on terms acceptable to the United States."⁹

The means of command & control, communication and intelligence have become a major factor influencing the development of military strategy and of military doctrine in general. Under its influence, there has been increasingly strong emphasis in U.S. military strategy on the first use of nuclear weapons and on the conduct of "limited" but protracted nuclear wars. The improvement of C³I systems is primarily intended to dramatically enhance the effectiveness of existing arms, both nuclear and conventional.

Virtually all U.S. nuclear and conventional arms programs are drawn up under the strong influence of achievements in the improvement of military command & control, communication and intelligence. This tendency was already apparent in the 1970's, but now it has become not just the leading tendency, but the decisive one, in the enhancement of the effectiveness of arms. What is more, arms development guidelines now depend largely on the development of the C³I system. A high-level official in the Department of Defense office of scientific and technical research, J. Wade, suggested that when weapons systems are being designed, the development of C³I systems should precede the development of the weapons systems.¹⁰ SIGNAL magazine took an even more categorical stand: "It should be the rule that no weapons system or support system will be used until the corresponding system of communication and electronic control has been determined and duly financed."¹¹

These authors could hardly be accused of exaggerating. The use of the latest achievements of electronics in military equipment on an increasingly broad scale is giving the arms race new and more dangerous momentum. To a considerable extent, the appearance of new C³I generations was the reason for the creation of the latest nuclear and conventional weapons systems, which are dozens or hundreds of times superior to earlier models of weapons and military equipment in terms of accuracy, force and effectiveness.

It is becoming more and more obvious that the measures U.S. military-political circles are taking to improve military command, control and communication systems are viewed by them as the decisive area of military-technical competition, in which they are striving for the fundamental "correction" of the qualitative arms race. And this is not even being concealed in Washington. For example, General B. Scowcroft, former U.S. national security adviser, frankly admitted that "the skillful merger of doctrine and technology, and its supporting elements, known as C³I, could eventually allow the United States to regain the superiority we had over the USSR in the early stage of the nuclear age."¹²

The creation of the new MX and Midgetman ICBM's and Trident SLBM's was made possible by the latest microelectronic systems in general and military command & control, communication and intelligence in particular. It is possible that the new generation of longer-range cruise missiles would not have made its appearance without the reliable support of C³I systems. The improvement of C³I is now a matter of great concern to the builders of the next generation of cruise missiles, which will be distinguished by a much higher speed and longer range (American experts believe that the group of unsolved C³I problems is the main obstacle here).¹³ The latest C³I systems are expected to considerably enhance the effectiveness of American atomic missile submarines. For example, systems guaranteeing steady communication with these submarines under any conditions and without the disruption of their combat functions will begin to be developed in 1986 and 1987.¹⁴

Another important aim of the improvement of C³I is the creation of a reliable system for the command and control of armed forces during a nuclear war.¹⁵ According to Pentagon strategists, the current measures in the sphere of C³I systems will allow them to "completely control" the development of a military conflict at any level and distance, and within a time frame close to real time.¹⁶

In addition, the measures connected with this colossal group of programs will aid in improving the communication and surveillance systems included in the national technical means of verifying the observance of arms race limitation agreements.

The NAVSTAR space navigation system is an organic part of C³I. According to the American press, this system will be capable of the highly accurate determination of the coordinates of means of destruction and targets, secure communication with the earth and transmit navigational information for ballistic missile guidance systems. With the latest devices for the detection of nuclear explosions, this system can secure the accurate guidance of bombers, surface missile-carrying ships and missile submarines, transmit information about nuclear explosions in a time frame close to real time (their number, force and coordinates) and make general assessments of nuclear strikes and inflicted damages.

The fact that the United States is striving to create the potential to put Soviet early warning, communication and control systems out of commission, regarding their destruction as the most important condition for a first nuclear strike by the United States, naturally puts us on the alert. It is no secret that the Pershing II missiles deployed in Western Europe, cruise missiles with all types of basing and ASAT system are primarily intended to perform these functions.

Therefore, Washington is openly striving to create a military command & control, communication and intelligence system which will allow it to carry out its adventuristic plans for "limited," "local," "counterforce" and other "controlled" nuclear conflicts. The creation of a global and effective system for the military command and control of U.S. armed forces will permit, according to Pentagon expectations, not only the control of the politico-military

situation in the world, but also the concentration of forces and resources in decisive areas, the unification of individual systems in a single and effective combat fist and the consequent dramatic enhancement of the capabilities of imperialism's entire military machine.

FOOTNOTES

1. C³I is the English abbreviation for command, control, communication and intelligence. This term applies to a broad group of systems securing intelligence, communication and the military command and control of weapons and combat equipment and of U.S. armed forces.
2. "Otkuda iskhodit ugroza miru" [The Source of the Threat to Peace], Moscow, 1984, p 36.
3. N. Baldino, "NATO C³ Compromise," SIGNAL, January 1985, pp 10-11.
4. SIGNAL, March 1985, pp 16, 35.
5. "'Zvezdnyye voyny.' Illyuzii i opasnosti" ["Star Wars." Illusions and Dangers], Moscow, 1985, pp 27-31.
6. ELECTRONICS, 1981, No 21, p 59.
7. PROGRESSIVE, 28 June 1982, pp 27, 28.
8. It is probably not necessary, or even possible, to describe all of the specific programs connected with the entire structure of the C³I system that is now being established in the United States. After all, more than 20 projects will be conducted in the strategic area alone, and just in the offensive link: They will entail the creation of systems for the command and control of strategic forces after the delivery of a nuclear strike; for the early warning of the launching of ballistic missiles, with the aid of the latest means of detection and with a view to the most diverse basing methods; for the detection of nuclear explosions; qualitatively new communication systems, most of them space-based, for all branches of the U.S. Armed Forces; systems for the command and control of U.S. armed forces in emergencies, etc. In all, the program envisages hundreds of major projects and thousands of minor ones.
9. "Report of the Secretary of Defense C. Weinberger to the Congress on the FY 1986 Budget," Wash., 1985, p 247.
10. AIR FORCE MAGAZINE, July 1982, p 66.
11. SIGNAL, November 1982, p 42.
12. AIR FORCE MAGAZINE, 1982, No 12, p 54.
13. DEFENSE DAILY, 9 January 1985, p 42.

14. SIGNAL, March 1985, p 7.

15. AIR FORCE MAGAZINE, 1981, No 11, pp 33-34.

16. SIGNAL, January 1982, p 27; MILITARY REVIEW, November 1981, p 23.

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